_________     SWAT MAGAZINE ISSUE THIRTY JUNE 2000    __________
  /         \___________________________________________/          \
 /            An Activists Guide to The Terrorism Bill              \
/                   from blagged.freeserve.co.uk                     \
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15 February 2000

As the Bill goes through the Houses of Parliament there will be new
amendments, which will result in some numbering changes; already the
Government have inserted new clauses 5,7,8 and 9 with clause 61 being
taken out. Clause numbers in this guide refer to the original draft
Terrorism Bill as a renumbered version was not available at the time
of writing . The fact the Government itself has had to amend so much
of the Bill so early on to make it clearer and close loopholes highlights
the difficulty many people will have in understanding its complex provisions.

When the Bill becomes an Act, the clauses will then be known as sections,
though provisions in the Bill already refer to this or that 'section',
meaning section in the Bill when it becomes an Act. The next and key stage
for the Bill is Report stage in the Commons when the findings of the Standing
Committee will be discussed.

Introduction

"Terrorism" has been defined so widely in the Terrorism Bill that a huge
and yet uncertain range of activity is caught. While the Bill is a serious
threat for those who are engaged in direct action there are grounds for
 hope. What was known back in 1994 as the Criminal Justice Bill not only
 polarised and politicised a lot of people, it also freed many of them
from concern about staying inside the criminal law. If sitting down in
 front of a bulldozer was now a crime, surely it would be more sensible to
deal with the bulldozer beforehand when you were less likely to be caught?
A crucial difference to the ‘CJB’ is the fact that while the Bill could
be used to clamp down on a wide range of activities, the law enforcement
agencies will have enough discretion to pick people and groups off on
their own terms. 

If there is effective and outspoken opposition to the Bill, the worst provisions
may be dropped and the state will be more hesitant about using what remains.
This guide attempts to go beyond a narrow legalistic view of the legislation
and look at the context in which it would operate. After all, as those of
us who have been harassed, detained and arrested while engaged in direct
action know, what happens in practice is often a world apart from the black
letters of the law.

PART I – The new definition of ‘terrorism’

The fundamental definition

The first clause of the Bill states:

Definition 1. - (1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat, for the
purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, of action which- 

(a) involves serious violence against any person or property,

(b) endangers the life of any person, or

(c) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of
the public

This clause is of the greatest importance as it used to define most of the
offences and powers in the rest of the Bill. There is a separate guide that
examines the definition more closely and which should be read for a thorough
examination of the issues. Straw has claimed in Parliament (Official Report,
14 Dec 1999, Vol 341 Cm 154) that ‘the new definition [of terrorism] will
not catch the vast majority of so-called domestic activist groups’. Unless
he has a very strange definition of activist groups this statement is quite
simply wrong. Serious violence against persons could include unplanned
violence between protesters and police at the end of big demonstrations.
While Straw does claim (Cm 154) that the Bill ‘is not designed to be used
in situations where demonstrations unaccountably turn ugly’, he was more than
happy to accept the allegations about the violence at demonstration in the
City of London on June 18 1999 being pre-planned. 

The possibility of violence to property alone constituting terrorism has rightly
been of great concern, as many do not feel damage to inanimate objects counts
as ‘violence’. Straw does say (Cm 158) that ‘I say with considerable care
that I know of no evidence whatever related to Greenpeace's activities that
could bring it remotely within the Bill's ambit.’ Since Greenpeace has been
involved in trashing genetics test sites, this might make you think that this
sort of activity would not be covered by the Bill. Then again remember that
specific assurances were given about the Harassment Act 1997 and how it wouldn’t
be used against protesters – the first few times it was used was against animal
liberationists. Greenpeace is very unlikely to find itself directly at risk
from the Bill as any attempt to use it against them would surely backfire and
cause public outrage. On the other hand radical genetics activists could find
themselves targeted in an attempt to divide and rule.

The police have started claiming that the use of fortifications, such as lock-ons
and tunnels on sites and in squats occupied by protesters, is not peaceful protest
as it endangers the life of protesters using them and bailiffs trying to evict them.
It is very likely, therefore, that under sub-clause (b) constructing such
fortifications would involve a threat for a political purpose to endanger
life, even if it was just your own life, and would therefore count as terrorism.
As a result the police could have the swathe of powers that will be examined
later. 

Subsection (1)(c) has to be the most vague and indeterminate of the three triggers
in clause 1. It is understandable that the Government wants to be able to deal
with new forms of terrorism – this clause was drafted in the light of the
nerve gas attacks on the underground in Tokyo – but surely any such attack
ould fall within the other subsections? It is unlikely to have much affect on
activists either. One example of action caught by clause one given by Charles
Clarke, Minister of State at the Home Office during the First Sitting of the
Standing Committee was hacking into the national grid system. This probably
would fall within (b) and (c) as it could cause traffic lights or hospital
machinery to fail, for example.

Overseas Terrorism

Under clause 1(2) the definition of terrorism is extended so that it covers
acts done or threatened anywhere in the world. Liberty have rightly pointed out
that there is much scope for prosecutions under clauses 57-59 (relating to
inciting terrorism overseas) to be motivated by pressure from foreign governments
and that a fair trial could be difficult to obtain as evidence and witnesses
would have to come from those countries. That said, they have not highlighted
that as clause 1(2) widens the scope of the Bill to any terrorism occurring
anywhere, there is an even bigger risk to those involved in overseas activism.
In essence anyone involved in solidarity campaigns with movements abroad that
fall within the new definition could be treated exactly the same as someone
involved in terrorism here.

So exactly who could be at risk?

If the Bill becomes law in its present form, it is most likely that the powers
will be first used domestically against those engaged in the struggle for
animal liberation. It is they who are presently the closest to what the
public considers terrorism. At the same time a combination of dirty
tricks, for example Sunday Times articles and careful provoking of riots
as happened in London on ‘N30’ (the day things kicked off in Seattle against
the World Trade Organisation) along with slick media manipulation and
press conferences will be used to try to divide the radical direct
action groups and activists from the liberals. Dirty tricks were a key
part of the state’s tactics in Northern Ireland, during the miners’ strike
and Greenham Common and it seems certain that they will continue to be used.
There has probably been enough dirt on Reclaim The Streets to allow the police
to feel confident about using some of the proposed powers against them and
groups working with them before another big day of action.

In terms of international groups, it does depends on what happens abroad
and how friendly our government is with the government in whose territory
 alleged terrorism is taking place. Certainly those involved in affairs in
anywhere from Afghanistan to Ogoniland, East Timor to Kurdistan, should be careful.

PART II – Proscribed Organisations

It is important to distinguish those offences that can only be committed in
relation to a proscribed organisation from the others in the Bill. Under
clause 3 the Home Secretary can proscribe, i.e. ban, an organisation if it:

(a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism,

(b) prepares for terrorism,

(c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or

(d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.’

The Minister of State for Northern Ireland Adam Ingram stated at the Second
Sitting of the Standing Committee that proscription was firstly a deterrent
for low-level terrorist activity, such as tracking the movements of a target,
and secondly a signal of the Government’s view of the unacceptability of the
proscribed organisation. At the Third Sitting he gave the following guidelines
for which groups might be proscribed: ‘a number of factors must be taken
 into account, for both domestic and international groups, including
the nature and scale of a group’s activities, the threat it poses to
 the United Kingdom, the extent of its presence within the UK and our
 need to support the international community in the battle against
international terrorism.’

So which groups are likely to be proscribed? Clarke states (Cm 225) that
‘the Home Secretary has no plans at present to proscribe any domestic
group’ though he is considering which international groups to proscribe.
The only groups proscribed at present are involved in Irish terrorism.
The junior minister quotes from the Consultation Document which suggests
only the Justice Department and Animal Rights Militia ‘have crossed the
threshold’. Proscription is a really extreme power and it is unlikely
that any domestic groups would be proscribed unless they are extremely
active and their public reputation has been blackened enough, through dirty
tricks or otherwise.

Under clause 5 those affected by an order of proscription can challenge the
Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe or later on a decision not to deproscribe
by going to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Committee (POAC), which is
set up by Schedule 3 of the Bill. However, it is wrong to call it an appeal
 as only the principles of judicial review apply. This means only the
 legality as opposed to the merits of the decision can be challenged, i.e.
whether the Home Secretary got the law wrong, and with clauses 1 and 3 as
vague as they are this is hardly a right. The only right of further
appeal is again on legal points only and such an appeal would go to
 the Court of Appeal. It gets worse: under clause 3(3) of Schedule 3,
not only can the representative of the proscribed organisation and their
lawyer be banned from the hearing, POAC can refuse to give full details
 of its reasons for dismissing an appeal. The Government's repeated
justification of the lack of judicial control here (and elsewhere) is
that it would prevent "second-guessing" of Secretary of State's decisions.
Ingram even ruled out consultation saying in the Third Sitting that ‘[i]f
everyone talked to all the human rights groups, the civil liberties groups
and political parties, the death of someone might be the result.’

The offences relating to proscribed organisations, which all carry a
maximum punishment of ten years and an unlimited fine are:

Membership – Clause 10 creates an offence of belonging or professing to
belonging to a proscribed organisation

Support – Clause 11 creates three offences being: (1) inviting support
(support not being limited to the provision of money or other property)
for a proscribed organisation; (2) being involved in organising a meeting
furthering the activities of or including a speech by a member of a proscribed
organisation and (3) addressing a meeting which is also addressed by a member
of a proscribed organisation or merely encouraging support for a proscribed
group (this could include just saying it shouldn’t be proscribed) in a
speech to any meeting

Uniform – Clause 12: wearing an item of clothing or displaying an article
to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a
proscribed organisation

It is really important to note that clause 11(4) defines a "meeting" as
being a meeting of more than two people, whether or not the public are
invited. So the simple act of someone, a journalist or negotiator, for
example, speaking to a member of a proscribed organisation in the presence
of another, be they a translator or a bodyguard would be an offence under
cl 11. Furthermore any member of such an organisation would not be able to
speak in public, for example at a parents' meeting at school without causing
anyone else addressing the meeting to become criminalised. The verb 'address'
is not defined but it is hard to draw a line between addressing a meeting
and speaking to a meeting, for example a caretaker asking if the heating was
too warm.

PART III – Funding and terrorist property 

The following offences relate to funding and "terrorist" property and carry
a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment and an unlimited fine. Under clause
20 it is a defence to these offences to prove that you were acting with the
express consent of a police officer.

Fund-raising – clause 14 creates three related offences of (1) inviting another
to provide property, (2) receiving property or (3) providing property where
you have reasonable suspicion it may be used for "terrorism"

Use and possession – clause 15 creates an offence of using or possessing property
for "terrorism"

Funding arrangements – clause 16 creates an offence of entering into or being
concerned into an arrangement whereby property is (to be) made available to
another where you have reasonable suspicion it may be used for "terrorism"


Money laundering – clause 17 creates an offence of entering into or being
 concerned in an agreement facilitating the retention or control of property
 likely to be used for terrorism (note that for this offence the burden is
on the defendant to prove they didn’t know property might be used for "terrorist"
purposes)

To comply with the International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism, the Government inserted a new clause '8' which gives UK courts
jurisdiction over offences in clauses 14-17 committed abroad. While before
this amendment UK courts would have been able to try cases where, for example,
money was held by someone here for the purposes of terrorism in another
country, the amendment allows them to try cases where the money and the
person holding it have been abroad and where that person and prospective
defendant is only passing through the UK. Of course the big problem here
is that our definition of terrorism is so much wider than that in the Convention.

Duty to disclose suspicions

Clause 18 (disclosure of information: duty) creates an offence of believing
or suspecting someone has committed one of the offences in the previous
section (clauses 14 to 17) due to ‘information which comes to his
attention in the course of a trade, profession, business or employment’.
The maximum punishment is an unlimited fine and 5 years. This could
end up being used to get journalists to report activists to the
police: while there is no offence of committing terrorism, clause 15
would make using or even possessing property for terrorism is an offence,
 so there effectively would be. This could cover, for example, possessing
tools for trashing a genetics test site or fortifying a protest site
 in anticipation of eviction. Journalists not telling all could be
 threatened by police who would have an excellent tool to keep
activist-friendly journalists in line. It could also lead to journalists
being forced to rely less on people in direct action movements for
information and instead turning to the state, etc.

The GAndALF case is a prime example of legal terms being given wide
definitions in order to hit radical reporting. In that case a supporter
of the Animal Liberation Front and the editors of Green Anarchist
were charged with conspiracy to incite persons unknown to commit
 unknown criminal damage by reason of their having printed reports
of ALF actions against animal abuse. The Court of Appeal only overturned
the convictions due to a technicality regarding the indictment.

Note: The offence in clause 18 does NOT apply to information that comes
to your attention in a personal capacity or relationship. The
Government has kindly restricted the offence to business relationships.
There are also extensive powers to seize terrorist assets and other
property in this part but as most activist groups survive on a
 shoestring, they have not been covered here.

PART IV – Terrorist Investigations

Clause 31 defines a terrorist investigation as not only covering investigations
into terrorist acts and their preparation, but also their "instigation".
Instigation seems to be a far more vague and loose term than incitement
as it covers general support for acts rather than just encouraging someone
to do a specific act. Incitement has to be very specific, so simply inciting
someone to bomb a "MuckDonalds" in Russia would not be enough, but inciting
someone to bomb a specific one or indeed all of them would be. Moreover,
to be found guilty of incitement it has to be proved that you intended to 
incite. Instigation is far more vague concept and could exist in a longer
timeframe and though might need to be based around more than one specific
act of terrorism, unless that act was exceptional. While there is no crime
of instigating terrorism, it is a trigger for many of the powers in the Bill

Under clause 32 if a police officer considers it ‘expedient for the purposes
of a terrorist investigation’ they could declare a cordon. Anyone going inside
or not following a direction to leave or remove a vehicle commits an offence.
While there is a defence of having a "reasonable excuse" it is not clear how
this will be interpreted. The cordon can last for 14 days and can be extended
to a maximum period of 28 days, surely enough for any eviction? With
terrorism so loosely defined and the only requirement for setting up a cordon
being expediency, a rather vague term itself, it would be hard to challenge
the use of this power, which only needs a superintendent to authorise it.
Worse is that even if you hadn’t been told about the cordon you would still
be committing an offence.

Clause 36 simply gives effect to the complex Schedule 5 which relates to search
warrants for searching premises in terrorist cases. According to Clarke in
the Fourth Sitting, the present version of these provisions is mainly used
to investigate terrorist funds. He also stated that searches will be
governed by Code A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE),
which is the main piece of legislation on police powers in England and Wales.
So it will not be possible for a police officers to search somebody of
the opposite sex. The main difference to the search provisions in PACE
is that that police would not have to satisfy a judge or magistrate that
they have reasonable grounds to suspect the commission of a serious arrestable
offence before obtaining a warrant under Schedule 5. 

However, there are two particularly worrying provisions in this Schedule.
First, in cases of ‘great emergency’ where ‘immediate action is necessary’
a superintendent can give permission for a search without a warrant.
Second and worst of all is paragraph 13, which could force a suspect to give
an explanation for any material found. While Liberty point out that failure
to obey would be contempt of court, they don’t mention that it is a separate
offence to recklessly make a statement that is untrue or even just
partially misleading. This carries a maximum of two years imprisonment and
a unlimited fine. How easy this will be to prove and how it will be used
is hard to guess at. Hopefully this provision, surely the most draconian
provision in the Bill that applies to the mainland, will never become law.

Clause 37 (Disclosure of Information) creates an offence of tipping off during
a terrorist investigation. The offence is much wider than it sounds as
 it also covers interfering with material likely to be relevant to an
investigation and disclosing anything to anybody if it is likely to prejudice
an investigation. Worse still (that phrase is becoming rather worn now)
it applies even if a terrorist investigation has not been started yet,
if you have reasonable grounds to suspect it might be and the burden
 will be on you to prove you didn’t. 

PART V – Counter Terrorist Powers

From the perspective of an activist, the new powers the Bill would create
are of far greater concern than the new offences. For as Straw points out
(Cm 162): ‘The main purpose of the Bill is not to extend the criminal code,
but to give the police special powers to enable them to prevent and investigate
that special category of crime.’ 

Powers of arrest and detention

A terrorist is defined in clause 38 as a person who 

(a) has committed an offence under any of sections 10, 11, 14 to 17, 52 and
54 to 56, or

(b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation
of acts of terrorism.

Clause 39 then allows a general power of arrest without a warrant for anyone
who a police officer reasonably suspects to be a terrorist and provides
that instead of the normal PACE rights the provisions of Schedule 7
(detention: treatment, review and extension) shall apply. The danger of this
power of arrest is that police do not need evidence of a specific offence
and can arrest for a more general suspicion of involvement or support for
terrorism – don’t forget what was said about "instigation". Police would
not be required to inform those being arrested of specific grounds for the
arrest either.

So while Straw is at pains to point out that no new offence of "terrorism"
is created by the Bill, this is beside the point. It’s characteristic of
this type of legislation that there a lot of arrests and few prosecutions.
This is backed up by an arrest card Fuascailt made advising the Irish
 community on the PTA. It says:

‘It is important to bear in mind that your detention will probably have
little to do with being a "suspected terrorist" and more to do with general
information gathering and intimidation of the Irish Community…Some
statistics: 98% of all those detained under the PTA were innocent of
 any crime. In 1995 (during IRA ceasefire) 22,691 overwhelmingly Irish
people were stopped and searched for up to one hour.’

Leon Brittan, the former Home Secretary, pretty much admitted this in a
1985 interview on Radio Telefis Eireann, when he defended the PTA saying
 ‘The object of the exercise is not just to secure convictions but to secure
information.’ What makes these arrests really frightening is that it is
usual practice for the arrested person to be held incommunicado without
any legal advice. It is very likely that these "fishing trips" could
be found to be a violation of the ECHR if used against activists, indeed
Liberty in their briefing produce strong arguments that the arrest clause
would be a clear violation of Convention rights.

While Schedule 7 does bring the regime for detention of those charged
with terrorist offences more into line with PACE than is the case under
the present legislation, there are still some extremely disturbing aspects.
Firstly access to a lawyer and the initial authorisation of detention
 by a court can be delayed up to 48 hours after arrest, as opposed to 36
hours under PACE. During the hearing on whether to authorise continued
detention, the court can under paragraph 28(3) exclude the person being
held and their lawyer and information relied upon by the police to justify
continued detention. So while there may be a right to a hearing, there
is certainly no right to a fair hearing. 

It seems that while a court needs reasonable grounds to withhold information
from the detainee or their lawyer, there is no such qualification for
 excluding them from the hearing. Hopefully there will be some guidelines
laid down for this power. The maximum period before charge or release is
still seven days as opposed to four days under PACE. The Government needed
 a derogation – an opt-out – from the ECHR for these extended detention
 limits in the NIEPA and PTA. They will be withdrawing it following the
Bill becoming law as they argue that there is no need since authorisations
of detention will now be made by judges not ministers, though this is very
arguable.

Another very worrying provision is that under paragraphs 3, 5 and 7,
relating to fingerprints, intimate and non-intimate samples respectively,
even if a detainee is not convicted, their fingerprints or samples will not
have to be destroyed unlike the situation under PACE. 

Note: Paragraphs 11-15 of Schedule 7 apply only to Scotland where PACE does
not apply.

Powers relating to searches and vehicles

A power to search a building to find a suspected terrorist on a warrant
from a magistrate is provided by Clause 40. All the magistrate has to find
is 'that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person whom
the constable reasonably suspects to be a [terrorist] is to be found there'.
They do not have to examine whether the constable's suspicions were reasonable
so it would be very easy for police to enter into houses on the flimsiest
of grounds as long as they can show the person they want to harass might
be there. Basically if you’ve been at all involved in any campaign or
group they start using anti-terrorist powers against, you would not be
being at all paranoid to expect a visit from the police and a free trip
 down the police station.

Clause 41 creates a general power of stop & search for anyone whom a constable
‘reasonably suspects to be a terrorist to discover whether he has in his
possession anything which may constitute evidence that he is a terrorist.’
With the definition of a terrorist being so vague and freed from the need
to be based on a specific offence it would again be difficult to challenge
the use of this power.

Clause 42 gives a specific power to stop and search vehicles and pedestrians
in a specified area ‘for articles of a kind which could be used in connection
with terrorism’ without needing the usual reasonable grounds. This would
replace the existing power inserted by section 81 of the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA) into s13 PTA 1989. An authorisation for
the use of this power can only be granted if an assistant chief constable
or in London a commander considers it ‘expedient for the prevention of acts
of terrorism’. In addition it has to be approved within 48 hours by the home
secretary and cannot last more than 28 days. 

This power is unlikely to be used much against us for they already have s60
CJPOA. It allows police to search people without needing reasonable grounds,
if an incident of ‘serious violence’ is feared. This power has been used
extremely readily at demonstrations, particularly animal liberation ones.
The lack of reported cases on s60 shows how hard it is to challenge the
interpretation of the phrase. While it can be only used to search for offensive
weapons and dangerous instruments, the police can carry out very thorough
searches as they claim to be looking for razor blades. The s60 power can
be authorised by a superintendent and does not need the approval of the
Home Secretary, but it can only last for 24 hours and could not be used
merely for threats to health and safety, etc. The s60 power also has the
advantage of being the trigger to permit police to use their new power to
demask people contained in the new s60A CJPOA. Desmasking powers were not
 put in the Terrorism Bill as they were not felt necessary, particularly
with the alternative of s60A being available.

Clause 46 permits an authorisation restricting or prohibiting the parking
of vehicles along a specified stretch of road if an officer ‘considers it
expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism’. While it has to be
given by one of the highest ranks of police officer, there is no exception
for orange badge holders. The authorisation can last for up to 28 days.

PART VI – Miscellaneous

Clause 51 gives effect to Schedule 6 containing provisions on port and border
controls, which shouldn’t be much of an issue except for those lucky
activists who jet around to Seattle, Geneva, etc. It does allow officials
to detain and question you for up to nine hours without needing any grounds.
Clause 52 creates an offence of weapons training, which covers providing,
receiving or inciting others to provide training in the making or use of
firearms, explosives or Nuclear, Chemical & Biological weapons. So as not
to catch the armed forces there is a defence that the purpose of weapons
training was wholly other than terrorism, but this defence doesn't sound as
watertight as the draftsmen might have hoped.

While the offence of weapons training shouldn’t worry activists, the offence
in clause 54 of directing a terrorist organisation should. It does not matter
what level you are directing an organisation which is concerned in the commission
of acts of terrorism and the maximum sentence is life imprisonment. We all
know the classic police inability to understand the concept of non-hierarchical
organisation and their insistence at protests to be taken to the "leader",
so they could well adopt a flexible interpretation of this clause. While
placing facilitation of a meeting within the scope of this offence could
be a bit over the top, on the other hand evidence of being a facilitator could
be the final piece needed to secure a conviction. It is possible this offence
would be used in the context of non-hierarchical groups as an alternative to
conspiracy charges, which are very unpopular among judges and readily chucked
out of court.

Possession of information

Liberty provide an excellent analysis of the draconian offences proposed in
clauses 55 (possession for terrorist purposes) and 56 (collection of information).
As they point out, there have only been two prosecutions under the predecessor
of the first offence and in both of those it was literature and correspondence
which was relied upon. After the failure of the GAndALF trial, the security
services must be licking their lips in anticipation of these offences
becoming law. As happened to the defendants in that case, the police and
security services would sift through everything personal to try to dig up
enough dirt to cast enough suspicions on your character to secure a prosecution.
Of course they would very much enjoy making copies of everything for their
own records as well. For the offence in clause 55, if the police find
anything on you or in the place where you are, you have to prove you did not
possess it and you have to prove the article found had nothing to do with
terrorism. You could be put away for ten years just for reasonable suspicion
in the circumstance that the article could be used for terrorist purposes,
even if there is a reasonable doubt. You could be done under this offence
for possession of a Genetix Snowball handbook in theory, so a lot of notable
people ought to watch out.

The offence of collection of information is very worrying as well. The Corporate
Watchers’ Address Book, which contains a list of ethically challenged companies
along the addresses of its offices and directors, is a prime example of a tool
for lobbying and information that could be caught as it is ‘information of a
kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism’.
Mere possession as well as collection of information is enough to commit the
offence and again the burden is on you to prove you had a reasonable excuse to
possess the information. This offence is worrying for journalists, especially
campaigning journalists with a record of investigative political journalism.
It is likely the police could target them to hinder their work, just as they
target photographers and video journalists on actions, seizing their films until
deadlines are past.

Inciting terrorism overseas

Clause 57 creates an offence in England & Wales of inciting terrorism overseas,
while clauses 58 and 59 contain the offences for Scotland and Northern Ireland
respectively. Only acts of terrorism that would constitute certain offences if
carried out in this country would count. Those offences are: murder; wounding
with intent (GBH); poisoning; causing explosions, and criminal damage being
reckless as to whether life is endangered. The justification in the Standing
Committee for this sledgehammer to crack a nut - the few dissidents in our
country that are involved in real terrorism - was that the world has moved on
since the time of apartheid, etc. Yes the world has moved on but there are
still many people living under the most appalling regimes who have to resort
to these offences to strive for basic rights or even their lives. What these
MPs really mean is that their world has now moved on and many people who they
would have protested against when they were students now need to be favoured to
gain important trade deals, etc. The definition in the recent International Convention
on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism distinguishes between innocent
people and state forces engaged in conflict situations, so the Government's claim
that innocent people's lives would be at risk from a changed definition is
playing on people's ignorance.

PART VII – Northern Ireland

Clauses 62 to 109 (Part VII) apply to Northern Ireland ONLY – this includes Schedule
9 which allows the police and army to search for munitions and transmitters.
The provisions in this part will gradually be removed as the situation in Northern
Ireland improves. It is therefore highly unlikely that these exceptional
provisions will be extended to the rest of the UK, even taking account
of the U-turn that Labour has done on terrorism legislation since it
came to power.

PART VIII – General 

Clause 113 provides that no prosecutions for any offence created in the Bill
can proceed without permission from the Director of Public Prosecutions,
a government appointee. One of the most damning criticisms of the Bill
that Straw and his supporters could not deal with was that the uncertainty
of not knowing what the DPP will do would scare off people from activities
which they have fundamental rights to doing in a democracy. This
‘chilling effect’ alone opens the Bill to serious challenges under the
Human Rights Act 1998. 

Straw avoids the point when he claims that the Act will be a ‘profound
safeguard’ against disproportionate use of the Bill’s powers. Citizens
 will not know how much of a safeguard the HRA will be until a prosecution
or use of powers under the Terrorism Bill is challenged and only then
when a ruling comes from the highest courts of the land. Even then, for
a citizen to have some certainty about the legality of their actions, the
subject matter of the decision will have to be rather similar to that of
their acts. As it will take a number of years for these rulings, the
chilling effect will be a problem for a long time.

Clause 116 provides for the interpretation of a number of terms in the act.
Worthy of note is the definition of "organisation" which ‘includes any
association or combination of persons’ so it would easily cover an
affinity group let alone a self-styled (horrible journo phrase, I know)
"disorganisation". Some have commented that the fact "premises" is defined
to include ‘any place and…a tent or moveable structure’ suggests that
protest sites are being specifically targeted. But the existing law
on searches under s23 PACE already defines premises in exactly the
same way so this fear seems unfounded.

Summary

‘We are being asked to accept a real paradigm shift. Somehow the threat to the
stability of the state has given way to threats to the corporate estate, and
 that will be the basis for the new definition of social terrorism. That is
a desperately dangerous path to go down.’ 

Alan Simpson MP (Cm 202)

It is best to view the powers and offences in the Bill as tools for the state
to use to enforce social discipline and their order on us. How much they dare
to use them indeed whether they get put on the statute book depends on whether
society consents or rather acquiesces. It’s time to get active…