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In giving an account of the War in Syria, I have endeavoured to state the facts as they occurred, of most of which I was an eye-witness. The Levant Papers have furnished me with much useful information, and I have endeavoured to make no statements that cannot be borne out either by them or by documents in my own possession.

In writing a work of this kind I have been obliged to publish letters and extracts of letters from these Papers, in order to save the reader the trouble of examining them, and, indeed, it is not in the power of the public to get hold of Parliamentary Papers without a serious expense; this I trust will be a sufficient excuse for the numerous documents that I have thought it necessary to give.

May, 1842.

In writing the history of the War in Syria, I began after the battle of Nizib, and the defection of the Turkish fleet, which had well nigh laid Turkey prostrate at the feet of her powerful vassal; but it is necessary that the uninformed reader should be acquainted how Mehemet Ali, who began a simple soldier, should have risen to such a height of power as to attract the attention of the nations of Europe, and cause them to come forward, at the imminent risk of a European war, to interfere between the vassal and the master.

Mehemet Ali is of low origin, and was born at Cavallo, in Roumelia, in 1769. He left his parents when young, and began his career as a tobacco-merchant, but soon tired of trade, became a soldier, and was sent to Egypt, at the time of the French invasion, at the head of a body of Arnauts (Albanians.) After the evacuation of Egypt by the French, he made himself extremely useful to Kourschid Pacha, the xiigovernor of Egypt, who was unpopular with the Mamelukes, and disliked by his own soldiers. Mehemet was too clever for the Governor, and soon began to see an opening for himself. Kourschid became jealous, and endeavoured to get rid of him; but the future Pacha of Egypt had gained over his countrymen to his interest, and, with the assistance of the Mamelukes, deposed the Pacha, and stepped into his shoes. His own talent, and the weakness of the Porte, kept him in place; though many attempts were made to remove him.

Mehemet Ali never openly opposed the Porte; he was the most submissive of Pachas, and always managed to gain his point, and each unsuccessful attempt of the Porte to displace him left him more powerful than ever. When the British landed at Damietta, in 1807, Mehemet Ali ruled in Egypt, and it was principally owing to his energetic conduct that the expedition failed.

The massacre of the Mamelukes, which took place in 1811, cannot be justified, even according to Eastern ideas. That they were extremely troublesome and dangerous there cannot be a doubt; they would have had no hesitation whatever in overthrowing Mehemet xiiiAli’s government, and putting him to death; and had he openly attacked them, he would have been justified; but a breach of hospitality is a greater crime in the East than in the West. He had invited the Mamelukes to eat salt with him, and he treacherously attacked and butchered them in the citadel of Cairo in cold blood. One alone escaped; he took a desperate leap over the battlements, his horse was killed on the spot, and he alone, of between 400 and 500, survived to tell the story of the massacre of his fellows.

About this time the Pacha began to extend his views beyond Egypt, and his first step was to take advantage of the opening afforded by the depredations of the Wahabees, a reforming military sect of Arabs, who had captured Mecca and Medina, plundered the caravans, and put a stop to the pilgrimages of the Faithful. Less actuated, it may be fairly supposed, by religious zeal than by political wisdom, he procured orders from the Porte, by virtue of which he attacked, and at length, after several campaigns, succeeded in subduing them; his two sons Toussoon and Ibrahim greatly exerting themselves in the war. The pachalic of the Holy Cities was in consequence granted by the Sultan xivto Ibrahim, but Mehemet Ali pushed his arms still further, and did not desist till he had got into his possession the most valuable parts of the coast of Arabia.

Shortly after the massacre of the Mamelukes, Mehemet, with the assistance of Colonel Seve (now Souliman Pacha), an officer of merit in the French service, set to work to raise an army and to discipline it on the European model. The latter was no easy task; he had to contend against the habits and prejudices of the Arabs, but nevertheless, he succeeded in this, as he has done in most of his undertakings. In 1824 he was enabled to send a powerful army and fleet to Greece to assist in putting down the insurrection; here the Allies interfered; the “untoward” battle of Navarino destroyed his fleet, and not more than half his army returned to the land of their birth. As a reward for his services, however, the government of Candia was conferred on him by the Porte.

From this time to 1831 Mehemet Ali employed himself in improving his country, and perfecting his establishments; and though according to our notions, the means he employed were not very mild or humane, the public works xvhe executed in a short time were almost as wonderful as those of Peter the Great.

His military and naval conscriptions, and other acts of tyranny, induced many of the inhabitants of Egypt to abandon their country and take refuge in Syria, and they were protected by Abdallah Pacha, the Governor of the province in which stands the celebrated fortress of St. Jean d’Acre. This Pacha was under considerable obligation to Mehemet Ali; but, nevertheless, disregarded all his remonstrances. Mehemet Ali was not a man to be trifled with; and, under the pretence of recovering his Fellahs and punishing Abdallah Pacha, he took steps from which the far-famed Eastern Question at length arose.

He assembled an army of 40,000 men, including eight regiments of cavalry, and several thousand Bedouins, a large park of artillery and a battering train. At the head of this army he placed his son Ibrahim Pacha. A squadron of five sail-of-the-line and several frigates were despatched to Acre in the month of November, 1831, a season of the year rather too late to commence a campaign. Nevertheless, Ibrahim having crossed the Desert, set himself down before Acre in December.

xviThe Grand Prince of Lebanon, the Emir Bechir, after much hesitation, paid him a visit in his camp before Acre, and brought presents of horses for Ibrahim and Abbas Pachas, and endeavoured to make his visit one of compliment only. Ibrahim, seeing the immense advantage of gaining him over to his interest, either by force or persuasion, detained him in his camp for several months, and at last obtained a promise of his co-operation; he was then permitted to return to Ibteddin, leaving, however, his grandson, the Emir Mahmoud, as a hostage for his fidelity.

The siege was conducted with so little skill both by land and sea, that six months elapsed before the fortress fell into the possession of Ibrahim Pacha, and then it was taken by storm. The following, extracted from the work of Mr. St. John, is the best account I have been able to procure^[1].

xxThe Turkish Government were not unwilling to see Abdallah Pacha deprived of Acre, as they thought he had assumed an air of too much independence, and they also hoped that Mehemet Ali, who they saw with a jealous eye was becoming too powerful, would exhaust his resources by undertaking a campaign in Syria. After the capture of Acre the Porte soon began to perceive that Abdallah Pacha’s position was taken possession of by a more powerful, a more ambitious, and a more dangerous vassal; they therefore ordered him immediately to withdraw from Syria, and not expecting compliance, collected an army of 20,000 men on the banks of the Orontes, and advanced another from Anatolia, to oppose him.

Mehemet Ali, however, had no idea of satisfying himself with the capture of Acre. He had now passed the Rubicon, and he directed Ibrahim to advance a part of his army on Balbeck to watch the operations of Hussein Pacha, who commanded the Ottoman army, and to occupy Damascus with the remainder. Ali Pacha, who commanded the Turkish troops in that city, evacuated it without firing a shot, and retired on Homs, by the old road of Palmyra, and joined the Turkish army.

xxiIbrahim Pacha, having now possession of Damascus, advanced on Khan Kousseir, where he arrived on the 6th of July. The next morning he attacked and defeated a part of the Turkish army, and took 3000 prisoners and 13 field pieces. On the 8th the Egyptian army entered Homs, and took 1500 prisoners and 14 guns. The remains of the Ottoman army retired on Aleppo, and formed a junction with the force under Hussein Pacha; from thence they continued their retreat, in two columns, on Beylan, and soon after Ibrahim took possession of Aleppo, where he halted a short time to reorganize his army.his army. On the 29th he again came in sight of the Ottoman army, again attacked, and again defeated them, taking 25 guns and 2000 prisoners. On the following day the Egyptians entered Alexandretta, where they found 14 guns and abundance of stores and provisions; and the Turks now retired on Mount Taurus.

The Sultan becoming alarmed for the stability of his throne, made great exertions, and speedily collected an army of 50,000 men, and a good train of artillery, and placed them under the command of Rechid Pacha, the Grand Vizier. The Egyptian army had now xxiiassembled at Adana, and on the 14th of October they drove the Turks from the defiles of Mount Taurus, and on the 20th the Egyptian advanced guard occupied Erekli, where they remained till the 27th of November.

On the 13th of December, the whole army was put in motion, and arrived at Koniyeh on the 17th, the day after the Turks had evacuated it. From that time to the 20th of December, various movements took place on both sides, and on the 21st the battle of Koniyeh was fought, when the Ottoman army was totally defeated and dispersed by Ibrahim Pacha, and the Grand Vizier taken prisoner.

Nothing now hindered the conqueror from marching on Scutari, where he might have arrived early in January, and before the Russians had reached the Bosphorus. Had he followed this course, Constantinople would have been revolutionized, and the power of the Sultan overturned, and most probably Mehemet Ali would have been placed on the throne of Osman.

The Egyptian army did not leave Koniyeh till the 20th of January, 1833, and reached Kutayah on the 1st of February. The Russians had by that time arrived in the Bosphorus, xxiiicalled in by the Sultan, who, being neglected by his natural friends, was obliged to apply to his natural enemy to protect him from the rebellion of one of his own subjects.

The arrival of the Russian squadron and army in the Bosphorus decided Ibrahim to enter into negociations, and the Treaty of Kutayah, by which the Ottoman empire was saved from immediate destruction, was signed, the Pachalic of Adana and the whole of Syria (by far the most valuable part of their conquests,) being entrusted to Mehemet Ali and his son.

This Treaty, so mortifying to the Sultan’s pride, was followed by that of Unkiar Skelessi, and the consequent departure of the Russian squadron from the Bosphorus; they had, however, learnt the road to Constantinople, which neither the British nor French Governments ought to have permitted, and the time is not far distant when they will profit by their experience.

Shortly after the Treaty of Kutayah, Ibrahim retired within the defiles of the Taurus, and the whole province was formally put under the government of Mehemet Ali.

Had the Pacha of Egypt been a wise man, and ameliorated, in the slightest degree, the xxivcondition of the people he had released from the barbarous rule of the Turks, so as to have made them feel the difference, he might have consolidated his power both in Syria and Egypt, and restored these two fine countries to prosperity. His tribute to the Porte was small, and he possessed the power to render the people both prosperous and happy. The conduct of his army, too, when passing through Syria had been most exemplary, and the inhabitants had to their astonishment observed the wonderful difference between an irregular and undisciplined Turkish force and the order and regularity of the Egyptian troops, and, generally speaking, were most favourable to the change of masters. But Mehemet Ali, though possessing ten times the intelligence and energy of a Turk, was still an Oriental, and only knew how to govern the people entrusted to his charge with Eastern despotism.

The powers of Europe now turned their attention to Egypt with increased interest, and England was the first to establish a permanent agent and Consul at the Court of Alexandria; her example was followed, shortly after, by the other great powers of Europe. Mehemet Ali had been permitted to send his officers to xxvEngland, and they were instructed in our dockyards in the art of ship-building, and were even received on board our ships to be instructed in seamanship and discipline. What greater proof could we have given of the interest we took in Mehemet Ali, than such a distinguished mark of favour? and what other conclusion could he have drawn, than that we were favourable to his government? The French were not behind us; they even went farther. A French officer of distinction had disciplined the Pacha’s army; he had now also a French Admiral at the head of the navy; and great credit is due to both for the state of order and discipline into which they have brought both arms of the service.

Had Mehemet Ali been now satisfied, he might have lived to see the inhabitants of the countries he ruled rich and prosperous, and invoking blessings on his head for having given them happiness, tranquillity, and security of property; but the old man, either mistrusting Turkey, or having a lurking ambition to be seated on the throne of Osman, instead of reducing his armies, and remitting part of the imposts on the people, began his government in Syria by increasing the taxation, and afterwards xxviintroduced the conscription, of all measures the most unpopular in Eastern countries.

Ibrahim was not insensible to the imprudence of those measures, and remonstrated with his father, and shortly after entirely withdrew from the management of the civil affairs of the country; when Scheriff Pacha was appointed civil governor of Syria, and established the seat of government at Damascus.

Mehemet Ali’s first new financial measure was the ferdeh, a tax on all males from twelve years upwards, varying from fifteen to five hundred piastres, according to their means. This was paid by all classes and religions, and the Christians, who before paid a poll-tax, were also obliged to pay the ferdeh, in addition to the regular taxes. Forced contributions were also occasionally raised to supply the exigencies of the government. According to Mr. Farren, the Syrian contributions was raised from 20,000 to 32,000 purses.

The Governor and local officers, it is true, were not allowed to receive bribes; but the people gained little by this. Besides the regular taxes, and the occasional forced contributions, the government was in the habit of purchasing what was required for the maintenance xxviiof the army at their own price, the inhabitants being obliged to deliver it into the government stores at their own risk and cost. They were also liable to be pressed to work at the public establishments, and even transported to distant parts of the country, receiving pay hardly sufficient to keep body and soul together.

In addition to these oppressions, whenever the army was put in motion the inhabitants were obliged to furnish animals to transport baggage and provisions, and were paid two-thirds less than the common wages of the country. If horses or mules were wanted for the government, they were seized without any respect to persons, and paid for at whatever price the authorities thought proper to give. Vessels for the transport of provisions and government stores were seized in like manner, and the owners paid about a third of the freight they could have gained in trade.

Tampering with the currency was a source of dishonest gain to the Pacha: taxes were ordered to be paid in certain coins, Mehemet Ali fixing the value always below its standard; in short, there was a system of legal pillage established from one end of the country to the other.

xxviiiThese oppressions were nevertheless borne with, for they are common in Eastern governments; and, had not their new ruler commenced the disarmament of the people, and the forced levies, they probably would never have endeavoured to shake off his yoke. But his measures, odious in themselves, were rendered quite intolerable by the mode in which they were executed. According to Mr. Farren, the conscription in Syria amounted to 11 per cent. on the male population; the classes who were exempt from the conscription were obliged to find substitutes either by fine or purchase, and many who had been seized and drafted into regiments more than once, and obtained their discharge by purchase, were again seized, and their remonstrances wholly disregarded.

It is not surprising that people, thus driven to despair, should revolt. In the year 1834 the insurrections began in the Haouran, and spread afterwards to the country of the Druses and Naplousians. These insurrections, however, Mehemet Ali managed with his usual energy to put down, and established more security to the people from being plundered by anybody but himself; that, and a greater facility and safety in travelling through the country, xxxiappear to have been the only merits of Mehemet Ali’s government in Syria. Thus things proceeded for a while, the Pacha exerting himself to fortify the passes of Taurus, and building barracks at Antioch and other places, particularly at St. Jean d’Acre, while Ibrahim and his officers laboured to introduce new cultures, as of the sugar-cane, the indigo plant, &c., and with some success; but this could not reconcile the Syrians to the grinding monopolies and vexatious burdens of their ruler, and very strong measures were required to keep up the Egyptian authority.

In the year 1838 Mehemet Ali first began to talk of independence, and announced to the Consuls his intention, at no distant period, of declaring himself. Shortly after this he set out on an expedition to the mines of Sennaar, and was absent some considerable time.

The Sultan, as might have been expected, had never ceased to form plans for the recovery of Syria to his rule, and as early as the year 1834 he had committed the charge of several of the pachalics of the eastern part of Asia Minor to a Circassian soldier, named Hafiz Pacha, in order that he might there raise an army for that purpose. Hafiz laboured with xxxiigreat zeal in the cause, and from the remoteness of the districts, his progress was unnoticed by the European Powers. At length, in the beginning of 1839 the Porte more openly made preparations for war; and on the 12th of February of that year, Count Molé for the first time brought the affairs of the East under the consideration of Lord Granville, the British Ambassador^[3]; and Lord Palmerston repeatedly wrote to Lord Ponsonby to discourage, by every possible means, the Porte from again embroiling themselves in war with Mehemet Ali; declaring, at the same time, that if the Porte was attacked, assistance would be given; but, if on the other hand they became the aggressors, it might change the whole face of affairs.

Notwithstanding the advice given to the Porte by the Allied Ministers at Constantinople, the Sultan, relying on the reports of the efficiency of his army in Asia Minor, communicated to him by his General, gave directions for the advance of the Turkish army, and they actually marched beyond Bir, which is only sixty miles distant from Aleppo. Mehemet Ali determined, however, not to be the xxxiiiaggressor, and directed Ibrahim to refrain from making any movement in advance.

Russia and Austria becoming alarmed lest the peace of Europe should be disturbed, instructed their Consuls at Alexandria to request that Mehemet Ali would desire Ibrahim to withdraw his troops towards Damascus, assuming that Ibrahim was the first to put his army in motion, which certainly was not the case. France seeing the possibility also of a rupture between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, expressed a strong desire that Great Britain would act in concert with her, and proposed to send a fleet of eight or nine sail of the line to the Levant, to co-operate with the British fleet, which she supposed would consist of ten sail of the line.

Whether Mehemet Ali was sincere in his desire to avoid hostilities with the Porte or not, is not very easy to divine; but his actions certainly seem in his favour. He not only remitted the tribute to the Porte, but he declared to M. Cochelet, the Consul-General of France, that if the troops of the Sultan were withdrawn on the other side of the Euphrates, he would order his army to retrograde, and direct Ibrahim to return to Damascus; nay xxxivmore, if the Turks would retire still further, he would recallrecall Ibrahim into Egypt; and if the Four Powers would guarantee peace, and procure him the hereditary succession, he would withdraw a great part of his army from Syria^[4].

Notwithstanding all this, Lord Ponsonby, so early as the 20th of May, 1839, declared the Pacha the aggressor, and sided with Russia. He finishes a long despatch to Lord Palmerston with these remarkable words, “Russia has declared a truth—a limited truth—the Great Powers cannot deny it; their repeated declarations engage them to oppose the aggressor^[5].”

In the beginning of May, Ibrahim seeing all prospect of peace at an end, left his agricultural pursuits at Khan Jouman, distant five hours from Aleppo, and immediately gave orders for the assembling of his army at the latter place. The army of Ibrahim was said to consist of 55,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 196 guns, besides 6000 irregular cavalry. That of the Sultan was supposed to amount to 80,000 men of all arms, and 170 guns.

On the 7th of June Mehemet Ali received intelligence from Ibrahim that the Turks had xxxvdriven back a detachment of Egyptian cavalry. He immediately invited the Consuls to a conference, and asked their advice as to his future conduct. They unanimously advised him to act on the defensive; and above all, not to send his fleet to sea, which he had determined on doing. This advice he decided for the present to follow, but a circumstance soon occurred to alter his determination.

On the 9th of June the Turkish fleet sailed for the Dardanelles, under the command of the Capudan Pacha; Captain Walker of the British Navy embarked with him as his adviser; and the Capudan Pacha intended to remain six or eight days in the Dardanelles. On the same day, Mehemet Ali, having received letters from Ibrahim, giving an account that the advanced guard of the Turkish army had attacked some of his troops on the territory under his government, lost all patience, and, in spite of the remonstrance of the Consuls at Alexandria, sent orders to Ibrahim to drive the Turks out of his territory, and then march on the main body; and, if victorious, occupy Malatiyeh, Kharput, Urfah, and Diyarbekr.

On the 16th of June Captain Caillier, an aide-de-camp of Marshal Soult’s, arrived at xxxviAlexandria, with orders to call upon Mehemet Ali to suspend hostilities, whereupon the Pacha gave him a letter to Ibrahim, desiring him not to pass the frontier; and, if in the Turkish territory, to halt, unless Hafiz Pacha continued to advance; he was then to engage him. On the 16th of June the first division of the Egyptian squadron sailed, and the remainder on the following day. Captain Caillier left Alexandria on the 19th for Alexandretta.

On the 25th and 26th of June, orders were sent by the English and French Governments to their naval Commanders-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, to proceed to the coast of Syria, and prevent a collision between the Turkish and Egyptian fleets, and urge them to return to their respective ports, in the event of their having sailed. They were also directed to open a communication with the Turkish and Egyptian Generals, and exert their influence to bring about a suspension of arms, and a wider separation between the hostile armies. Should the Turkish General refuse to agree to these propositions, it was to be pointed out to him that all communication by sea would be closed, and his supplies cut off. If the refusal, on the other hand, should proceed from xxxviiIbrahim Pacha, similar representations were to be made to him, and communication cut off between Alexandria and Syria. In some respects the English instructions differed from the French. The English Admiral had no orders to cut off the Turkish supplies by sea, in the event of their refusing the armistice; nor had he any orders to receive a Russian squadron should they tender their services; but the English Admiral was at liberty to force the Dardanelles should a Russian fleet arrive at Constantinople, which the French Admiral was not authorized to do without fresh instructions.

On the 2nd of July a further instruction was sent to Sir Robert Stopford in accordance with the instructions of the French Admiral, to receive a Russian force should it offer its co-operation^[6].

Lord Ponsonby having written to Sir Robert Stopford, that war was inevitable between the Turks and Egyptians, the Admiral, on the 7th of June, being then in Palermo Bay, despatched Sir Thomas Fellowes in the Vanguard, together with a brig, to the Levant, to watch the Turkish squadron, but with positive orders to observe the strictest xxxviiineutrality. At this time the Commander-in-Chief had received no instructions how to act.

Sir Thomas Fellowes arrived in Besika Bay on the 29th of June, and the following day received a visit from Captain Walker, accompanied by M. Etienne Pisani, and Mr. Lander, the British Consul at the Dardanelles, with an offer, on the part of the Capudan Pacha, of provision, and also to ascertain whether Sir Robert Stopford was expected, and whether he would interfere with the Turkish fleet. This, of course, Sir Thomas Fellowes declined answering. M. Pisani then went on board the ship of the Capudan Pacha, who distinctly informed him that he had orders to attack the Egyptian fleet, and should sail in a few days. He was under some apprehensions that the French would interrupt him, but he assured M. Pisani, that, unless the English interfered also, he should proceed in the execution of the Sultan’s orders.

On the 30th of June Sultan Mahmoud, who had been in bad health for some time, died, and his son, Abdul Medjid, a youth of sixteen, was declared of age by the Divan, and proclaimed Emperor. Orders were immediately xxxixforwarded to Hafiz Pacha to suspend hostilities, and the Capudan Pacha was directed not to quit the Dardanelles.

A few days after the Sultan’s death, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs communicated to the Ambassadors that the young Sultan was disposed to confer the hereditary Government of Egypt on Mehemet Ali, on condition that he would restore Syria, Candia, and the Holy Cities, to the Porte^[7]. These pacific intentions, however, were too late, for on the 24th of June Ibrahim Pacha had attacked and totally defeated the Turkish army at Nezib, who lost all their guns, ammunition, and baggage, and the remainder repassed the frontier in complete disorder. In addition to this misfortune, the Capudan Pacha had sailed from the Dardanelles, and on falling in with Admiral Lalande, sent his second in command on board to say, that when he heard of the Sultan’s death he was of opinion that he had been poisoned by Hosrew and Halil Pacha, who were devoted to Russia; and under this impression he had written to Hafiz Pacha to march on Constantinople; that he should apply to Mehemet Ali for assistance, and in xlthe mean while take the Turkish fleet to Candia. This M. Lalande advised him not to do, and he then intimated his intention of going to Rhodes.

The French and English Ambassadors, in consequence of these untoward and unexpected events, wrote to the Grand Vizier to assure him of their support, and Lord Ponsonby also wrote to Sir Robert Stopford to recommend him not to be at any distance from the centre of affairs.

The Admiral left Malta on the 2nd of July, in consequence of a private letter from Lord Minto, desiring him to proceed off the south end of Cyprus, and there wait for orders. His arrival there he communicated to Lord Ponsonby under date of the 11th of July. It does not appear that at this time Sir Robert Stopford had received Lord Palmerston’s instructions of the 25th of June, which pointed out to him the course he ought to follow in the event of the defeat of the Turkish army, and on the Egyptian and Turkish squadron meeting each other at sea. Had these instructions arrived, the Admiral, no doubt, would have conceived it his duty to have taken still stronger steps to have prevented the defection xliof the Turkish fleet; and it is to be regretted that in the absence of instructions he had not taken upon himself to have immediately proceeded off Alexandria, and forced the Capudan Pacha to return to his duty, particularly if he had received in time Lord Ponsonby’s reply (dated July 19,) to his letter announcing his arrival off Cyprus, in which his Lordship states,

Sir Thomas Fellowes’s orders were so strict, that though he kept company with the Ottoman fleet for several days, he had no communication with the Capudan Pacha; but even if he xliihad, he could not have discovered his intentions, because Captain Walker himself, who was on board, had no notion that they were going off Alexandria for any other purpose than attacking the Egyptian squadron. This, however, was very far from the Turkish Admiral’s intention.

On the 9th of July an Ottoman corvette arrived at Alexandria, having on board Sheriff Aga, the kiaya of the Capudan Pacha, who was the bearer of a letter to Mehemet Ali; Mehemet did not conceal its contents, which were to ask permission to bring the fleet to Alexandria as a friend, stating that the Capudan Pacha disapproved of the election of Hosrew to the post of Grand Vizier, and that he would co-operate with Mehemet Ali in placing him as vakeel to the young Sultan, as the only person fit to rule the empire. On the same evening Mehemet Ali sent the Nile steamer with his reply to the Capudan Pacha, and on the 10th the Rhadamanthus left Alexandria to communicate this intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief, as appears by Colonel Campbell’s despatch to Lord Palmerston of the 11th of July^[8].

On the same day that the Rhadamanthus xliiileft, a Turkish steamer arrived with despatches from Hosrew Pacha to Mehemet Ali, who was very communicative to Colonel Campbell. The purport of this despatch was, to announce the accession of Abdul Medjid, and his pardon of Mehemet Ali: that it was his intention to send him the nichan iftikhar, a decoration indicative of high favour, and grant him the hereditary succession of Egypt and its dependencies; and that he had ordered the Turkish troops to retire from the frontiers of Syria.

On the reception of this, Mehemet Ali said he should consider the war at an end, and should order Ibrahim to retire on Marash. That he hoped the Allies would be satisfied; and as soon as everything was settled, he would proceed to Constantinople to do homage to his sovereign. That should Achmet Pacha wish to deliver up the fleet, he would not accept it, but send it back to Constantinople; and that as for the post of vakeel, he would rather remain in his present position. All this seemed very well; but we shall shortly see how he acted.

On the 14th of July the Turkish fleet arrived off Alexandria, and, as no doubt had been previously arranged, formed a junction xlivwith the Egyptian fleet. The following morning, the Nile steamer, bearing the flag of the Capudan Pacha, arrived in the harbour, and the traitor was well received by Mehemet Ali^[9].

xlvSo secret was all this kept on board the Capudan Pacha’s ship, that Captain Walker, who was with him, had no notion of what the Turkish Admiral was about, until he sent a steamer to direct two ships, who, being bad sailers, were left astern, to rendezvous off Alexandria. On speaking to the Capudan Pacha, he was assured that Mehemet Ali had put the Egyptian fleet under his orders, and that he was proceeding to Egypt to confer with Mehemet Ali on what were the best steps to be taken for the good of the Turkish empire. When the Turkish fleet anchored, xlviCaptain Walker landed, and left Alexandria for Constantinople on the 20th, much to the annoyance of the Capudan Pacha, who wished him to remain.

The Allied Consuls used all their endeavours in vain to advise Mehemet Ali to send back the fleet. He said he would have nothing to do with Hosrew, who was his bitter foe; and that he had written to him to send in his resignation; and should Hosrew do so, all would be right.

Mehemet Ali’s enmity to Hosrew was much strengthened by the latter having sent, through the hands of the French Consul, letters to the General and inferior Admirals of the Turkish fleet, calling upon them to return to their allegiance. These letters M. Cochelet gave to Mehemet Ali, who delivered them to the Admirals, when, as might have been expected from the position they were in, they tore them up with indignation.

On the 16th about sixty of the principal officers of the Turkish fleet came on shore, and were presented to the Pacha, who received them in a gracious manner. By the 28th the whole of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets had entered the port of Alexandria, so that had xlviithe Commander-in-Chief proceeded off there immediately after the Rhadamanthus had joined him, or even had he proceeded after his receipt of the despatch of the 25th of June which I believe arrived by the Hydra, there would have been ample time to have secured them. This would have completely anticipated Lord Palmerston’s instructions of the 7th of August^[10], which directed the Admiral to use his utmost efforts to prevent the Turkish fleet going into Alexandria, and to endeavour to oblige them to return under the authority of the Sultan.

The Commander-in-Chief, however, may have had other instructions, which do not appear in the Levant Papers, for the guidance of his conduct, or he might have thought that the force under his orders, without the co-operation of the French squadron, was not sufficient to have enforced his demand on the Capudan Pacha to return to his allegiance if supported in his treason by the Egyptian fleet. But, nevertheless, I think the experiment might have been tried, and probably would have succeeded to a certain extent, because the entrance into the harbour of xlviiiAlexandria is so difficult and so shallow that large ships must be considerably lightened before they can enter, and neither the Egyptian nor Turkish Admiral would have ventured to weaken their squadron by either entering in detail or lightening the ships in the presence of a British squadron hostile to their measures. The Commander-in-Chief, however, as I have before said, may have had other instructions, or he took a different view of the case, for instead of going off Alexandria he repaired to Besika Bay, where he was joined the same evening by the Powerful, Ganges, and Implacable. At this point, then, my history of the War in Syria commences.

State of Affairs in the Levant in August, 1839—The Author’s Interview with Hosrew Pacha—Sir Robert Stopford at Constantinople; his Interview with the Sultan—Impolitic Junction of the English and French Fleets—Sir John Louis takes the command of the English Squadron—The Author tenders his Resignation.

The loss of the battle of Nizib, the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, and the defection of the Turkish fleet, threatened to place Turkey at the mercy of Mehemet Ali, or under the protection of Russia. At the earnest desire of France Ibrahim Pacha halted, and in the beginning of August, 1839, the combined squadrons of England and France assembled in Besika Bay, ready to proceed to Constantinople, should Ibrahim march, or should the Russians leave Sebastapol.

The allied ministers, however, do not appear to have considered how the squadrons were to pass the Dardanelles; the current runs constantly to the southward, and the prevailing winds are generally 2from the opposite direction. It rarely happens that a favourable breeze sufficiently strong springs up to enable ships to pass the Hellespont; and we had not an adequate number of steam vessels to take the ships in tow. Russia had a strong fleet and army at Sebastapol, and could approach the Sultan’s capital at pleasure, whereas we were powerless, and as for being able to protect the Porte from a sudden attack, either from Russia or Ibrahim Pacha, we might just as well have been in Malta Harbour.

As forty-eight hours would have been sufficient for a Russian fleet and army to arrive at Constantinople, it always appeared to me, after the unforeseen misfortunes which had befallen the Porte, the ambassadors and admirals ought to have taken the responsibility on themselves, and anchored the squadrons in the Golden Horn the first favourable opportunity; the ministers of the different Powers could then have treated the Eastern Question on an equal footing. Russia would, no doubt, have stormed, threatened, and, perhaps, withdrawn her ambassador, but she would not have gone to war, and, after a time, would have sent her squadron to Constantinople to join that of England and France; strong detachments should then have appeared off Alexandria, 3and, most probably, Mehemet Ali, seeing a close union between the great Powers of Europe, would have given up the Turkish fleet, and restored Syria to the Porte.

This was not done, and France soon began to take a new view of the Eastern Question, and shortly after refused to send the combined fleets to Alexandria to demand the Turkish squadron, and, under all circumstances, I think she was right; a hostile fleet could not enter the harbour easily, or indeed at all, if proper precautions were taken. We had no troops to land, and the absence of the Russian squadron would have given Mehemet Ali reason to believe the four Powers were not united. Alexandria might have been bombarded, it is true, and the fleet burnt, but that would have been almost as untoward an event as the battle of Navarino, and certainly would not have tended to strengthen the Turkish empire; it might have provoked Mehemet Ali to order Ibrahim to advance, which would have brought the Russians to Constantinople, and once there, they most assuredly would not have permitted us to pass the Dardanelles.

About this time the Admiral and many of the officers were at Constantinople, when it was intimated 4to him that he might shortly expect decided instructions; leave was immediately stopped, and the officers were ordered to rejoin their ships forthwith. These instructions were supposed to be, to proceed to Alexandria, but they never arrived, as France objected to the measure. Admiral Roussin was recalled, we became cool with France, and began to draw near to Russia. During my sojourn at Constantinople, I had an opportunity of examining the sea defences, the capital, and the Bosphorus, and I sent Colonel Napier, who was with me, to examine the land fortifications. The batteries were numerous, well placed, and mounted many heavy guns; but with a strong wind and current a fleet might pass down without much damage, and if that fleet was accompanied by an army the fortifications could be taken in reverse; the defences of the Dardanelles are strong to the sea, but weak to the land; a fleet might descend with the stream, but it would be no easy matter to go against it.

When at Constantinople I had an interview with the Grand Vizier, Hosrew Pacha. The old man appeared nearly eighty; he is of low stature, and a good deal deformed; his countenance fresh, with a most intelligent and penetrating eye, his dress 5simple. On entering his apartment he immediately rose, kissed my cheek, complimented Colonel Napier on his soldier-like appearance, and begged us to be seated; seeing us in boots, he called for his, which he drew on in great haste, apparently to be on a footing with us. Pipes and coffee were produced, and, after a few puffs, he began the conversation through Mr. Redhouse, the interpreter, by expressing his satisfaction at seeing me in the Sultan’s capital. I replied that I hoped to have an opportunity of performing some services for His Imperial Majesty, and that I thought the first step he ought to take, should be, inviting the combined fleets to Constantinople. The old man appeared to apprehend more danger from Mehemet Ali than from Russia, and did not relish this proposal; he roundly asserted that it would cause an insurrection, and the Christians would be massacred; that he was not afraid of Russia, and although the empire had been brought to a very low ebb by the incapacity of the men the late Sultan had placed at the head of the army, followed by the defection of the Turkish fleet, she was still strong; that he had no fears of Russia, and should her troops advance on Constantinople he would put himself at the head of the Ottoman army and defeat 6them. I asked him where his army was, as it had been destroyed at Nizib and replaced by boys; remarking that Russia would never think of marching, but would come by sea, pass the Bosphorus in spite of all the batteries, and take possession of Constantinople with the greatest ease.

To this he replied that, in the neighbourhood of the capital there was an army of 30,000 men, which was quite sufficient for its defence, and it would be much better if one half of the fleet was to remain at the mouth of the Dardanelles and the other half proceed to Alexandria. To this I answered, that nothing could be done at Alexandria without troops, that the entrance of the harbour was too shallow for ships to enter with their guns, and that Mehemet Ali had declared that if the fleet appeared there, he should instantly direct Ibrahim to march on Scutari; this would inevitably bring down the Russians, who would object to the French and English approaching Constantinople, even if they could get a fair wind, and the probability would be that it would embroil Europe in war, and Turkey would be sacrificed.

The Vizier inquired why an English army could not be spared to attack Alexandria. To this I replied, we had already too much on our hands; 7what with the troubles in Canada, the war in India, the prospect of an outbreak in China, and the Chartists at home, it was impossible to spare troops, and that I was sure Parliament would not grant supplies for such an expedition. This ended our conversation. Hosrew was strongly suspected of being in the interest, if not the pay of Russia; how far that is true, is hard to say.

The Admiral obtained firmans to see the mosques and other curiosities at Constantinople, which have been so often described that I shall not torment the reader with a repetition of an often told tale.

After passing ten days pleasantly enough between Constantinople and Therapia, and being entertained by the ambassadors, we embarked on board the Carysfort, which bore the Admiral’s flag, and, in tow of a steamer, left Therapia, and shortly after anchored abreast of the Sultan’s Asiatic palace. A royal salute was then fired, and returned by the batteries in the vicinity of the Imperial residence. Nothing can be more beautiful than the passage down the Bosphorus, and nothing more magnificent than the Sultan’s palaces and the country-houses situated on its banks.

Mahmoud was fond of building, and just before 8his death had finished a new palace on the European shore. With Colonel Napier’s permission, I give the account of an interview with the Sultan in nearly his own words.

“The household troops, such as they were, received the Admiral and his suite on landing, and we proceeded into a handsome apartment on the ground floor, where we were received by the Sultan’s brother-in-law, the Seraskier, Halil Pacha. Pipes were in this instance dispensed with, and after partaking of coffee and sweetmeats, handed round in gold filagree cups and saucers, richly studded with diamonds, a very common-place conversation took place, through the medium of the interpreter, between Sir Robert and the commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces.

“In about a quarter of an hour his ‘Highness’ sent word that he was ready to receive us, whereupon the whole suite, consisting of about a dozen British officers, proceeded, ‘booted‘ as we were, up a magnificent staircase, and through numerous apartments, the floors of which shone forth in all the splendour of the rarest and most highly-polished woods; and whilst the Turkish courtiers glided noiselessly along, in their purple slippers of thin 9morocco leather, a most martial tramp proclaimed our entrance into the presence chamber, where, on a sofa, sat the effeminate-looking Sultan, girded with the Sword of Osman.

“Abdul Medjid, the youthful Sultan, far from being

was a pale and sickly-looking youth, of apparently three or four and twenty, though in reality his age exceeded not seventeen; but it is said that his frequent visits to the harem had given him this appearance of premature age.

“He was plainly dressed, not in the Oriental style, but in a plain cloth military surtout and pantaloons, a short blue cloak, gracefully placed on his left shoulder, and a fez on his head. The only sign of regal magnificence displayed by him was a few brilliants on the clasp of his belt, with which the hilt of the sabre was likewise thickly studded.

“We formed half a circle round his Imperial Majesty, who did not deign to rise, and were presented by the Seraskier. Sir Robert Stopford then said, that the gratification he had received at seeing Constantinople, together with the attention he had met with, was very great. The Sultan, through 10Halil Pacha, who seemed to prompt him in all he uttered, replied, he was very glad his Excellency had felt so gratified.

“The Admiral then said, that he had been entrusted by Her Britannic Majesty with the command of a fleet, to render any service which might be required by the Sublime Porte. To this the Sultan bowed. Here ended the conference; we retired with the Seraskier, partook of the parting bowl of sherbet, and in four-and-twenty hours were once more in the midst of the fleet in Besika Bay.”

The fleets remained there till the end of October; the English then proceeded to Vourla for the winter, and were shortly followed by the French squadron, part of which went to Smyrna. The English now consisted of twelve sail of the line; the French of nine. The French ships were much larger and better manned than ours, and Admiral Lalande was indefatigable in exercising them, and I must admit that in harbour manœuvres they were equally as expert as ourselves, and in some respects superior; and I cannot refrain from observing that keeping the two fleets so much together was a most impolitic measure. When the French squadron first joined Sir Pulteney Malcolm in the Downs they 11were all abroad; the five or six years they had been almost constantly in company with the British had brought about a most astonishing change for the better, and although it may be very advantageous to have an alliance with France, there ought to be no acting together with fleets if it can possibly be avoided.

On the 22nd of January, 1840, Commodore Hyde Parker sailed for England, (his broad blue pennant had been up a few months,) and the Commander-in-chief shortly after obtained leave to proceed to Malta, with six sail of the line, and Sir John Louis, the Superintendant of Malta Dockyard, was ordered to Vourla, to take command of the remainder of the squadron; this was an unusual measure, and by no means complimentary to myself, who was the next senior officer. I in consequence proffered my resignation to the Admiral, which he declined to accept, and after some explanation with him my letter was withdrawn, and I pocketed the affront.

The English Fleet winters at Smyrna—Summer Cruise—Insurrection in Lebanon—Opinion on the proper course of the English Fleet—The Powerful and Edinburgh sent to Beyrout—Murder of a Frank; conduct of the French Consul—Insignificance of the Insurrection—Mission of Mr. Wood—Grievances of the Mountaineers—Author’s Letter to the Egyptian Admiral—Letter from Souliman Pacha—Suppression of the Insurrection—Ignorance of the Allied Consuls—Visit to Tripoli—Excursion into the Mountains—Appearance of the Country—Ships ordered to Vourla Bay—Author’s Report to the Admiral.

The squadron now consisted of six sail of the line^[11], which, by degrees, were moved up to Smyrna, a much more agreeable anchorage than Vourla.

I had been confined to my cabin for six weeks with a severe cough, and I took up my quarters at Boujar, a small village a few miles from Smyrna, which very soon re-established my health; there was very good English society at both places, and the time passed agreeably enough.

While the squadron lay at Vourla the sulphur dispute with Naples commenced; their ports were 13blockaded, and the Admiral proceeded to the Bay with three or four sail of the line; this decided measure brought the King to his senses, and the question was settled through the mediation of France. On the 4th of June the squadron left Smyrna for a summer cruise; the French preceded us by a few days. We visited the beautiful island of Mitylene, which possesses one of the finest harbours in the world, completely land-locked, and capable of containing any number of ships; from thence we proceeded to Scio, which had not recovered from the ravages of the Turks during the Greek insurrection. The town was still in ruins, and there appeared little probability of it ever recovering its former splendour. From Scio we returned to Mitylene, from thence to Mosconisi, and, after visiting the ruins of Assos, passed between Mitylene and the Main, and anchored in Besika Bay on the 24th. Here the Gorgon joined, with the intelligence of an insurrection having broke out in Lebanon; of Mehemet Ali having offered to give up the Turkish fleet, and of his preparing an expedition to put the insurrection down. This expedition was chiefly composed of Turkish frigates, manned with mixed crews, and carrying an army of 14from 12,000 to 15,000 men, of which 4000 were Turks; thus employing the Sultan’s ships and troops to put down the Sultan’s subjects, who were anxious to shake off the yoke of Mehemet Ali. Hosrew Pacha was disgraced about this time, and a daughter was born to the Sultan; like an expert politician, Mehemet Ali sent Sami Bey to Constantinople, to compliment his master on the birth of a daughter, and to express his readiness, now the Grand Vizier was disgraced, to enter into negociations, and give up the fleet. This was evidently a blind; and it so far succeeded that a part of the squadron had actually sailed before his intentions were known; so secretly and so actively had he carried on the embarkation of the troops at the arsenal.

Colonel Hodges, the British Consul-General at Alexandria, had given every facility to the Turkish soldiers and sailors to desert, and when his conduct was brought before Parliament, Lord Palmerston declared that though he had no instructions to that effect, he perfectly approved of his assisting, by every means in his power, the Sultan’s subjects to return to their allegiance. On that declaration of Lord Palmerston I founded my opinion that 15the squadron ought immediately to proceed to the coast of Syria, seize the Sultan’s ships and troops, and carry them to Rhodes, till further orders, or allow them to act on the coast of Syria in assisting the insurrection, as circumstances might point out. Sir John Louis had no orders on the subject, and did not think proper to take the responsibility on himself. He, however, sent the Castor and Cyclops to Beyrout, for the protection of British subjects and property, and the Gorgon to Malta for instructions; the squadron returned next day to Vourla, and the Powerful to Smyrna.

In a few days orders arrived from Sir Robert Stopford for the Powerful and Edinburgh to proceed to Beyrout, but on no account to interfere in any way with the Egyptian squadron; the Commander-in-chief having taken the same view of the question as Sir John Louis. The French admiral was, however, not so certain of our intentions, and he despatched a steamer, with directions, it is generally supposed, to advise the immediate return of the Turkish ships to Alexandria. On the 1st of July we sailed from Vourla, and arrived at Beyrout on the 7th. The Turco-Egyptian squadron, with the exception of two frigates and several corvettes, had sailed two days before, on their return to Alexandria, 16after landing their troops. The Castor, which was cruising off the port, had seen them the day before my arrival.

It would have been easy to have come up with this fleet before they reached their destination, but as my orders were positive not to interfere, I anchored at Beyrout. Had we sailed from Besika Bay the day the Castor did, we should have found them at anchor, and it would not have been difficult to have caused a movement amongst the Turks, which would have furnished me with an excuse for carrying out my own views, and I may add, the policy of the Government; but at sea it could not have been done without a direct interference, from which I was interdicted; and here I may remark, an officer’s taking responsibility on himself, and acting without orders, is very different to acting in direct disobedience of orders, even when satisfied they are erroneous, and it must be a strong case to justify such a breach of discipline.

On my arrival at Beyrout, I was visited by Mr. Moore, the British Consul, who gave a most alarming account of the state of the country, and of the want of discipline and insubordination of the Albanian troops, who formed part of the Egyptian army under the immediate command of Souliman Pacha.

17The servant of a French nobleman had been murdered, and the Consul of that nation had rather hastily struck his flag because the murderer was not immediately executed. He had been tried and condemned, but nothing would satisfy the Consuls short of his immediate execution, however contrary to the military law of Egypt, which required the sanction of the Viceroy. A deputation was sent to Alexandria to demand his execution, which took place on board the flag-ship there; and on the return of the deputation the French Consul rehoisted his flag, under a salute. The French Government disapproved of his conduct, and he was recalled.

On making inquiry, I found there had been one or two persons murdered by the Albanian troops, an occurrence not very extraordinary in Eastern countries, and not to be wondered at when we consider an army of nearly 15,000 men was collected in the neighbourhood of the town. I ascertained that the French Consul on striking his flag had put his countrymen under the protection of the Sardinian Consul, except this nobleman, whom Mr. Moore took charge of, and as it did not appear to me the British Consul had any authority to make a selection and give protection to this gentleman, I declined interfering; and a little more experience showed me that 18the outrages of the Albanians were as much exaggerated as the strength and respectability of the insurrection undoubtedly was. Mr. Wood, one of Lord Ponsonby’s dragomen, had been sent by the ambassador into the mountains of Lebanon, to ascertain the real strength of the mountaineers, and at his instigation a petition was signed and sent to the British Ambassador by five chiefs, one of whom, a sheik of inferior note, was styled the Seraskier^[12]. In fact the insurrection was never of any consequence. The mountaineers were justly dissatisfied at being obliged to work in the coal mine of Corneille, and on being required to deliver up the arms which had been supplied them to assist in putting down another sect. An attempt was also made to introduce the conscription, which is quite at variance with their ideas, and is viewed throughout the whole district of Lebanon with horror and detestation; moreover, they were oppressed with heavy taxes, the greater part of which went into the coffers of their own prince, the Emir Bechir; the odium, however, was thrown on Mehemet Ali, who only received 30,000 dollars annually from the mountains. They were unprovided with either arms or ammunition, were headed by no chief of note, and never could 19assemble, even for a few days, a force of a thousand men; nevertheless with that number they showed a considerable degree of boldness, and occasionally advanced to the walls of Beyrout, and fired a few shot into the town. Mehemet Ali, seeing the danger of a rising in Syria, should the mountaineers succeed, with his usual promptitude and decision, at once sent a powerful army to Beyrout; on their arrival, pacific proposals were sent to the mountaineers, who submitted. The following morning the greater part of the Egyptian camp was struck, and they marched to the neighbourhood of Deir el Kammar, the capital of the mountains; a little resistance was shown by small parties on the first advance, and the Albanians were sent to disperse them; in accomplishing this, several villages were destroyed, and they penetrated to the heights of Brumanah, and burnt the village and convent of Betmarie. Observing this from the Powerful, I sent the following letter to the Egyptian Admiral, to which Souliman Pacha replied.

Whether this was well translated or not, and whether what is stated here is correct, I am not able to say, but I must do them the justice of observing, that after that remonstrance I had nothing to complain of. The Egyptian troops marched to the neighbourhood of the Emir Bechir’s palace, Osman Pacha advanced from Balbeck, and the Emir sent his own troops to disarm the mountaineers. There were no executions, and only seven Emirs, at the instigation of the Grand Prince, were sent into Egypt, and from there were banished to Sennaar.

So badly informed were the allied Consuls, who felt a great interest in the mountaineers, and believed everything they wished, that for upwards of a week after the insurrection was put down, they fancied it in full force, and it was from a French merchant, who showed me a letter from Souliman Pacha’s secretary, I first learnt the actual state of the Mountain in the neighbourhood of Beyrout.

24I sent the Edinburgh to Tripoli to learn what was passing there, and I followed on the 18th. On my arrival I found the mountaineers in that district, with few exceptions, had laid down their arms, and all was quiet; both ships watered, and returned to Beyrout. The exaggerated statements of Mr. Wood and Mr. Moore to the ambassador at Constantinople, who was ready to believe anything to the disadvantage of Mehemet Ali, had, however, their effect, and no doubt very much accelerated the signing the Treaty of the 15th of July.

At the very time I was writing to the Admiral that the insurrection was at an end, he was receiving letters from Constantinople, that it was in full force. On our return from Tripoli, we made an excursion into the mountains, on the road to Deir el Kammar, and there we saw nothing like the ravages of war; the country was beautifully cultivated to the tops of the highest mountains, and had we not known to contrary, we should have supposed from the appearance, that it was well governed. Nothing can be more beautiful than the mountains and villages of Lebanon, inhabited by a hardy and honest race of beings, and not a spot capable of cultivation is allowed to lie fallow. Terraces to support the soil 25are built up at great expense, and water conducted for irrigation throughout the mountain. The mulberry-tree is cultivated with great care, and produces two crops of leaves; the first goes to feed the silkworms, and the second the cattle in autumn. All kinds of fruit and vegetables are also produced, and the vine flourishes in great luxuriance nearly up to the summit of the mountain. As we were winding along the difficult passes we observed a steam-ship at sea, several thousand feet below us, making the best of her way to Beyrout, and before we had finished our repast, which the kindness of Mr. Moore had provided, we were agreeably surprised by the appearance of Captain Henderson, of the Gorgon, who had arrived from Alexandria, with orders to join the Commander-in-chief in Vourla Bay; this was a great disappointment, as we had projected excursions to Damascus and Balbeck, and also to the most interesting parts of these beautiful mountains. The subjoined is my report to the Admiral.

The English ships withdrawn from the coast of Syria—The Author appointed to the command of a Squadron—Return to Beyrout—Instructions to the Squadron—Letters to the Egyptian Authorities, the British Consul, the Emir Bechir, and others—Proclamation to the Syrians—Letters from the Emir Bechir and Souliman Pacha.

On the 3rd of August we took leave of Beyrout, and sailed in company with the Edinburgh, to join the Commander-in-chief’s flag, leaving the Castor and Gorgon on the coast. Thinking it probable that counter orders might be sent to Rhodes, we made the best of our way thither. On the 10th we made Castel Rosso, on the coast of Caramania, and there fell in with the Ganges, commanded by my old friend Captain Reynolds, who brought me direction to hoist a broad blue pennant, and take under my command the Ganges, Thunderer, Edinburgh, Castor, and Gorgon, and return to Beyrout. He was the bearer of the Treaty of the 15th of July, and of orders to assist the mountaineers, supposing the insurrection to be in full force; the Ganges was directed to pass to the east of Cyprus, and the 30Thunderer to the west, in order to pick me up. All sail was made, and by noon next day we were fortunate in joining the latter ship, and then made the best of our way to Beyrout.

The service was rather of a delicate nature; the insurrection was over, and twenty days were allowed Mehemet Ali to reject or accept the Treaty of July. In the quarantine ground, two miles from Beyrout, were encamped 4000 Turks; it was known they were dissatisfied, and wished to return to Constantinople, but how to assist them, and how far to go under the existing treaty, was not very easy to decide; it was, however, important some effort should be made before they were moved out of our reach. It was also desirable to prevent, if possible, that enterprising officer Souliman Pacha (who had organized the Egyptian army) from removing the stores from the magazine, and from strengthening the town.

My position was not agreeable. If I commenced hostilities before the expiration of the twenty days and Mehemet Ali accepted the terms, I should be accused of precipitation, and of causing an unnecessary sacrifice of life; on the other hand, should Mehemet Ali hold out, I might be accused of supineness. 31Under this embarrassment we anchored at Beyrout on the 12th of August.

After perusing my orders, Lord Palmerston’s instructions, and the third article of the Convention, and giving them my best consideration, it appeared to me evident that, under all circumstances, nothing but a very decided demonstration could be undertaken, following that demonstration up by hostilities, should opportunity offer.

Beyrout is a small town surrounded by a wall, with a few weak turrets mouldering to ruins, and mounting very few guns. The arms, provisions, and ammunition were stored in two weak castles. About a mile and a half from the town, on a point of land, stands the quarantine establishment, surrounded by a high wall; on this establishment the Turkish troops were encamped, a second camp was a little removed, and a third a still greater distance in the country, where were quartered the Egyptian and Albanian troops.

My first object was to rise and protect the Turks, the second to recover the arms of the mountaineers.

The 13th was employed in preparing the following proclamation, and the letters necessary to 32carry this into execution; and at eleven o’clock of the 14th the squadron weighed. The Powerful was placed within three hundred yards of one castle, the Edinburgh about the same distance from another, the Ganges close into the bay, with her broadside bearing between the two camps I have described; the Thunderer off the point, and the Castor in the bay round it. The orders were as follows:—

An officer was then sent to the Governor and the Consul with the papers marked 1 and 2. Lieutenant Fitzjames landed in the Turkish camp, a service of some danger, with No. 3, and the Proclamation. No. 4 was sent to the Grand Prince, and No. 5 to his Nephew. The Governor declined giving any answer, and the commander of the Turkish forces said he could not act without orders.

An attack on the town depended entirely on a movement in the Turkish camp, but they either had not spirit or inclination to throw up their caps and declare for the Sultan; or it is possible the soldiers were kept in ignorance of the proclamation, for though we remained three days in our position 34no movement took place. I threatened to commence hostilities should the Turkish troops be moved, but in the night they were gradually withdrawn by a gate we could not see, and mingled with the Egyptians.

Towards dark, as I suspected, the removal of the stores from the castles and water side began, and I sent an officer to remonstrate and threaten, and it was with much difficulty I refrained from putting my veto on the proceedings, through the medium of a few 32lb. shot; this could easily have been done; but was it justifiable? I thought not—and most unwillingly made up my mind, unless a fair opportunity offered, to allow the twenty days to expire.

The Grand Prince sent no answer, but a few days after, his surgeon came on board, and gave me to understand that as soon as the Turkish troops landed the Emir would declare for the Sultan; the Emir Bechir Cassim sent a favourable reply, but wavered till he could see what turn affairs were likely to take.

Vessels were constantly arriving with provisions and warlike stores, which were detained, much to the 40annoyance of the unfortunate crews and passengers, and, I may add, to our own. Many of the vessels were loaded to the water’s edge, quite unseaworthy should it blow, and badly found in water and provisions; this induced me to write to Souliman Pacha as follows:

Generous behaviour of Souliman Pacha; Intercepted Letter from Boghos Bey to that Officer—Interview of the Consuls with Mehemet Ali—A Turkish Squadron equipped—Arrival of the Turkish Troops—Force of the Egyptian Army—Its proper line of Action.

Souliman behaved with great generosity, though enraged at the detention of vessels, which appeared to him contrary to the usages of war; he received the sick into the hospitals, with a promise to deliver them up when demanded, and allowed not only the vessels detained, but the squadron, to be supplied with fresh provisions and vegetables, and, I may add, did everything to prevent a collision taking place.

On the 19th an Egyptian cutter arrived with despatches from Boghos Bey to the Grand Prince, to Souliman, and to the Governor of Beyrout; they were all to the same purpose, tending to show that France was determined to take an active part in favour of Mehemet Ali; the French merchants and priests were not idle in circulating reports to the same effect, and they were generally credited in the mountains. I subjoin Boghos Bey’s letter.

On the 20th, an Egyptian frigate, armed en flute, bound to Scanderoon with stores, was detained by the Castor, stationed off the Point, to give notice should the Egyptian fleet appear off, to raise the blockade.

On the 27th I heard from the Admiral, announcing his arrival off Alexandria, and was shortly after reinforced by the Revenge, Benbow, and Magicienne. The Consuls, on their first audience, had laid before the Pacha the Treaty of the 15th of July, which he rejected at once; and he gave them to understand it was useless coming to him at the expiration of either the ten days or the twenty, for they should have the same answer; and that what he had won with the sword, he should defend with it; and he added, that after the expiration of the twenty days, the sooner they took themselves off the better, as 46their longer stay would neither be for their honour or his interest. The old man kept his word; on the 5th of September Raifat Pasha and the Consuls again presented themselves, and they were dismissed with the same answer.

The Admiral, in his last dispatch, gave me to understand I might shortly expect a small Turkish force would arrive at Cyprus, under the orders of Captain Walker, who had been promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral in the Turkish service. This appeared business-like, and we anxiously looked forward to some active service during the remaining two months of summer.

Shortly after this, I received a dispatch from Lord Ponsonby, announcing that a war with France might be expected at any moment, and recommending the ships to be on their guard, and that the Turkish Government had recalled the expedition. Some of the Turkish vessels had already sailed, and Admiral Walker, with great judgment and decision, pushed on, and sent me word of his approach. Not a moment was lost; the Hastings, which had joined, was sent to Cyprus to reinforce him, and supply his ships with provisions, and I removed my pennant to the Gorgon steamer, and ran down 47the coast as far as D’Jebail, to ascertain the best landing place; from there I crossed over to Cyprus, where I arrived next afternoon. Admiral Walker had anchored the day before.

The Turkish troops, to the amount of 5300 men, had been landed. The Government, with their accustomed want of foresight, had started them with only a fortnight’s provisions, of which only three days remained. With all my desire to commence active operations, it would have been madness to have brought this force to the coast of Syria, where nothing could be procured in the event of a reverse. The troops had really a very respectable appearance, and were much better than I expected. After a conference with the Admiral and General, it was decided to leave it to Admiral Walker’s discretion to start the moment he could procure a moderate supply, and we agreed to meet off Sidon, as by that time I should have determined on what part of the coast we should strike the first blow, on the success of which all our hopes depended.

From Cyprus we ran over and reconnoitred St. Jean d’Acre, which I was glad to see did not present any great obstacle to an attack from sea. Many men were employed completing the works on the 48land side; but the sea front, I suppose, was considered sufficiently strong.

From Acre we went off Tyre, which was occupied by Albanian troops, and in the evening anchored at Beyrout, having run over all this ground in little more than forty-eight hours. The following day the Carysfort was despatched to Cyprus with more provisions. On the 9th of September, the ships in the offing, who had directions to bring Admiral Walker to Beyrout, made the signal for a convoy. Sir Robert Stopford, in the Princess Charlotte, also hove in sight, and before sunset the whole were at anchor off the town. Sir Charles Smith, who had arrived in the Pique a few days before in bad health, was still too unwell to take the direction of the military affairs, and Sir Robert Stopford did me the honour of placing the troops under my command.

Souliman Pacha at this time was at the head of the army at Beyrout, and was supposed to have 15,000 men under his orders. Ibrahim and Osman were at Balbeck with 10,000 more; the garrison of Sidon consisted of 3000; that of Tripoli, and in the neighbourhood, 5000; the rest of the Egyptian army, consisting of from 40,000 to 50,000 men, were stationed in various parts of Syria.

49Had the Egyptian troops at Beyrout, with the exception of the garrison, marched to the heights of Ornagacuan and the high land over Nahr-el-Kelb, those at Balbeck on Gazir, Harissa and Antoura, and those at Tripoli pushed along shore by D’Jebail the moment we landed, there is little doubt but we should have been withdrawn, and the troops sent to Cyprus, and Mehemet Ali would now have been in possession of Syria, and England, in all probability, involved in war with France; or even had we remained inactive, and contented ourselves with occupying a strong hold only, we should have incurred the same risk.

The Allied Troops landed in D’Jounie Bay—Encampment—Reconnoissances—Submission of the Emir Abdallah—Beyrout summoned to Surrender—Reply of Souliman Pacha—Impolicy of the Attack on Beyrout—Forbearance of Souliman Pacha—Capture of D’Jebail—Captain Martin’s Report—ReconnoissanceReconnoissance to Merouba—Report to the Admiral.

As Beyrout was surrounded by a slight wall without a ditch, it did not appear to me advisable to make our first impression there, because had we succeeded in obtaining possession of the town, we should have been penned in by a very superior force, and had no opportunity of communicating with and arming the mountaineers, without whose assistance it would have been quite impossible to have made any impression on Souliman Pacha’s army. Under these circumstances, I suggested to the Admiral, who was commander-in-chief of the allied forces by sea and land, that we should put the troops ashore in D’Jounie Bay, in the province of Kesrouan, there intrench ourselves, and arm the mountaineers, who, we had reason to suppose, would flock down and join the Sultan’s standard. This province is separated from El-Kata by a deep gorge, through which 51runs the Nahr-el-Kelb; a stream only passable at its mouth, a few miles higher up at Argentoun, four or five leagues from the sea, and at Basquinta, where it rises. A road leads from Beyrout along the sea-shore to its mouth, passing round a precipitous promontory jutting into the sea; on this promontory stands a convent of monks. Another road leads further inland to a village, and from that village you may descend by a very rugged path across Nahr-el-Kelb (or Dog River), and ascend to another convent, on the top of the hills which look down on D’Jounie Bay. To the northward a road leads from Tripoli along shore, and crosses a bridge over another gorge; besides which, there are several roads which can be traversed by troops from Balbeck, leading to Antoura and Gazir, the capital of the province.

After dark on the 9th of September, the Turkish troops and marines were moved into the steamboats, which was accomplished by two in the morning; soon after eight they weighed, and proceeded off Beyrout Point to draw the enemy’s troops in that direction, and there wait till the sea breeze set in. This had the desired effect, and a few shot and shell were pitched into their columns to keep them in play. At ten the 52Powerful weighed, accompanied by Admiral Walker, in the Turkish line-of-battle-ship, a frigate, and corvette, the Pique, Castor, Carysfort, Daphne, and Wasp, and stood towards D’Jounie. The Castor and one steamer were directed to anchor off Nahr-el-Kelb, enfilade the pass, and land a Turkish battalion to the north of the river, and occupy the high ground over it, to prevent the advance of the Egyptians when they discovered our real attack. The rest of the squadron proceeded towards D’Jounie, where they anchored at two in the afternoon, and the whole of the troops, under the judicious direction of Admiral Walker and Captain Reynolds, were landed by four o’clock. The heights were immediately occupied, a couple of companies of marines, commanded by Captain Childs, were detached to reinforce the Turks at Nahr-el-Kelb, and a battalion was posted in the village of Zug, about a league distant from the camp; beyond them, a couple of battalions of Turks occupied a strong position, having their left flank protected by an impassable gorge^[13]. I took up my quarters in a Maronite chapel, in which we placed a gun; this chapel served for dining-room, bed-room, and powder 53magazine. My establishment was landed from the Powerful, and I look back to the month I passed there as one of the happiest of my life. Provisions were abundant, wine not bad, and Archdukes, Princes, Pachas, and Emirs were entertained; and I fear the laws of the prophet were frequently infringed by our Turkish allies.

The Carysfort and Daphne were despatched to D’Jebail to drive the Albanians out of a strong château, and impede the sudden advance of troops from Tripoli. The Wasp flanked the bridge I have before pointed out. After the troops were landed, the ships and steamers took up positions to protect the flanks of the camp in the event of an attack, and those in advance, if hard pressed, were ordered to retire, disputing the ground, but not to risk a severe loss. The Admiral, with the Princess Charlotte, Bellerophon, Ganges, Thunderer, Edinburgh, Hastings, Benbow, and the Austrian squadron, remained at Beyrout; the Zebra, and the Austrian frigate Guerriera, commanded by the Archduke, covered the bridge near the quarantine ground, and the Revenge was stationed in the bay between it and Dog River, to harass the enemy (should they advance,) and give us timely notice of their approach. 54At midnight the Revenge made the signal the enemy were advancing; I immediately landed and turned out the troops, and the Powerful was warped closer in; but it proved a false alarm. The following morning we began throwing up intrenchments, which were finished on the fourth day; and much praise is due to the exertions of both officers and men; Captain Reynolds, Berkeley, and indeed all the Captains and Commanders, were indefatigable. The defences were much too confined to secure our whole force; and I wished them enlarged, but the Engineer officer differed with me, and the Admiral ordered them not to be changed. During the time they were in progress, I occupied myself in gaining a knowledge of the country, and of the roads leading to our position, and I soon ascertained that there was little danger of being disturbed, even had we to contend with a more powerful army.

At first the mountaineers came in slowly, and the Admiral gave directions to re-embark the troops in a few days, but I succeeded in persuading him to allow them to remain. Our stay gave confidence to the inhabitants, who in two or three days began to flock in in great numbers, and the Emir Abdallah, 55nephew of the Grand Prince, and governor of the province, who had retired before a Turkish battalion, sent to his capital the day after we landed, came over in good style, bringing with him a considerable number of followers tolerably well mounted and armed. I now ordered Gazir, the capital of the province, to be occupied, and the road reconnoitred leading to Merouba, where Ibrahim and Osman Pacha had collected a considerable force; another detachment was sent to the neighbourhood of the convent of Harissa, on the right of Gazir, under Captain Loué, a Prussian officer attached to the Turkish army, both detachments having orders to retire to the camp should the enemy advance on their line. On the 15th of September the enemy pushed a reconnoitring party as far as Ackshout, on the road to Harissa, where they remained an hour, and then returned to Merouba; they seemed undecided, whether to advance on Gazir, Harissa, or Argentoun; their position gave them the choice of the three roads.

On the 11th a flag of truce was sent into Beyrout by Sir Robert Stopford and Admiral Bandeira, with a summons to Souliman Pacha to withdraw his troops: subjoined are the summons and reply.

57In answer to the above the following was, after some time, forwarded:

I should have thought that the Egyptian general could have found some one in Beyrout to have translated the summons, and it did appear that he treated the admirals rather cavalierly; nevertheless, the summons was sent in French, to which he replied that, he was engaged in a council of war, and that the reply would be ready in the morning. A heavy fire was immediately opened on the two forts, but the town was spared as much as possible, and the following morning a letter was brought off from Souliman, as follows:—

I thought at the time it was impolitic opening 60a fire on Beyrout unless it was determined to follow it up by an attack. The mountaineers had before witnessed the little damage done at D’Jounie and along the coast by the Egyptian squadron, when they fired on the armed mountaineers, in various parts along shore; and when they saw that a powerful British squadron could not drive the Egyptian troops out of a defenceless town, it did not give them a very high opinion of our power. Souliman well knew the moral effect keeping possession of Beyrout would have on the mountaineers, and determined not to abandon it till forced; we ought to have taken the same view, and either not have opened a fire at all, or persevered until they were driven out, whatever mischief was done to the town. Had the same measures been taken at Beyrout that were taken at Sidon, there is no doubt but we should have got possession of it. We should have lost men, it is true, but in war that must be expected, when a great point is to be gained; and gaining the principal sea port on the coast of Syria, in view of the mountains, was a great point, and would have had an immense moral effect. Withdrawing the squadron, which we did on the 16th, with the exception of the Edinburgh and 61Hastings, which ships occasionally kept up a fire on the town, gave Souliman the opportunity of telling the mountaineers that he had beaten off the British squadron.

The Pacha, though much annoyed, no doubt, at our proceedings, yet showed himself a man of great forbearance. During the time the cannonading was going on, the Indian mail arrived; our intercepting despatches from Alexandria furnished him with a fair excuse for stopping this mail, but as its detention had nothing to do with hostilities then going on, he hoisted a flag of truce, and delivered the mail, with a very civil message that all letters to and from India should be religiously forwarded. The Admiral, not to be outdone in civility, wrote a letter of thanks, and sent Souliman, who I have since learnt was a jolly and hospitable old soldier, a package of wine, that had been detained in an Egyptian vessel.

At this time the Admiral arrived at D’Jounie Bay, and the Castor and Pique having embarked their marines, went off Acre, Caiffa, and Tyre; and the Bellerophon took her station, with the Revenge, off the Nahr-el-Kelb, and covered that most important pass; the road was broken up, and at night an 62officer was stationed on shore with blue lights to burn, should the enemy attempt to advance in that direction.

The Albanians at D’Jebail did not seem disposed to give up their castle. On the 12th I sent 220 marines and 150 armed mountaineers, with orders to Captain Martin to turn them out: his report will show that it was not easily done; the officer in command rather incautiously advanced to the castle, and met with a severe loss. The mountaineers in this district came in also for arms in great numbers. Captain Martin, with great zeal, pushed on to Batroun, a little to the northward of D’Jebail, and drove the Albanians from that neighbourhood, which gave him an opportunity of distributing more arms to the warlike inhabitants.

On the 22nd I marched, with a Turkish battalion and a battalion of marines, by the road of Antoura and Argentoun toward Merouba, through the strongest and most difficult country I ever beheld, over roads hardly passable, and under a fiery sun; the marine battalion, unaccustomed to marching, were sorely pressed, and arrived with difficulty at Argentoun; there they halted, and I went on with a couple of companies of Turks, who were good marchers, holding a party of marines, the least fatigued, ready to advance should we be pressed. About two hours before sunset we came in sight of Osman Pacha’s camp and the Albanian standards; they appeared intrenched in a very strong position. The marines were now ordered to move on and show themselves, and we continued to advance through a most difficult but beautifully romantic country. In an hour we joined the mountaineers, under the Scheik Francis (the person who had been designated the Seraskier by Mr. Wood), in position in a small 67village, a little distance from very precipitous rocks, through which an execrable road led to Merouba, where Osman was intrenched. I desired the mountaineers to throw themselves amongst the rocks, to see whether they were occupied or not, which they did with considerable reluctance, till assured all was safe; they then went on with great alacrity: this enabled me to reconnoitre Osman’s position; he appeared well fortified, and from that I augured he was as much afraid of being attacked by us as we were of being attacked by him. In the evening we returned to Argentoun, where we attempted to get some rest, but from the numerous bedfellows in the shape of monstrous fleas, our slumbers were anything but sound. At dawn of day we were again on the move, and returned to the camp, after a very hot and fatiguing march. The following is my report of this reconnoissance to the Admiral:—

Proposed attack upon Sidon—Correspondence between Sir Robert Stopford and the Author respecting the command—Attack on the Heights of Ornagacuan—Report to the Admiral—Return to D’Jounie.

Having ascertained that Ibrahim had no immediate intention of attacking our position, it became necessary to undertake something bold immediately after the rally I intended to give the troops in our immediate front, should they not come over. I therefore proposed to the Admiral to make an attack upon Sidon, to which, with some reluctance he consented, and, in the afternoon, I was rather surprised at receiving the following letter:

This appeared to be making me so complete a cipher, that I replied as follows:

The Admiral saw the reasonableness of my request, and replied as follows:—

I now thought everything finally settled, and I requested the Wasp might be sent off Sidon. The Admiral, however, fearing a heavy loss, was unwilling the town should be attacked, and he again wrote to me on the subject.

I left things in this state on the evening of the 23rd, and finding that no further communication had been made by the Albanian chief on our front, I directed General Jochmus to descend into the valley of the Dog River with three Turkish battalions, move up the valley, and take the road leading 75to the heights of Ornagacuan on the enemy’s left. Another battalion crossed the bridge near the mouth of the river, and occupied the heights on the opposite side, to watch the Beyrout road, and cover a battalion of marines and the Austrian rocketeers who crossed higher up, and advanced on the enemy’s front. The Albanians, afraid of being cut off from the road leading to Boharsof, and not liking the appearance of the marines in their front, moved to their right, and gained the heights of Ornagacuan, occupying a strong position above the road by which General Jochmus was advancing. The Turks, moved with great rapidity and gallantry.

General Jochmus, the chief of the staff, accompanied by my aide-de-camp, Lieut. Bradley, put himself at the head of the skirmishers, and was followed by Selim Pacha, leading a Turkish battalion. The mountaineers also joined, and were not the last in advancing. The enemy’s skirmishers were driven in, and the main body, consisting of about seven hundred men, after firing two volleys, retired by the road of Boharsof; the Turks followed them up with great vigour, made three or four hundred prisoners, and dispersed the rest. This first success gave confidence to the Sultan’s troops, 76and opened the whole district of the Kata, and enabled us to arm many of the mountaineers of that province. Our loss was only an officer wounded, and two men killed.

79It would have been desirable to have continued on these heights, but the advance from Beyrout, where Souliman Pacha was encamped, with from 10,000 to 12,000 men, was so easy, and our retreat across the Nahr-el-Kelb so difficult, that I thought it prudent next day to recross the river, and occupy our former position, and prepare for a blow on Sidon, where it was least expected.

Proposed Attack on Sidon abandoned; resumed—Instructions—Correspondence between the Author and Sir R. Stopford—Arrival at Sidon—Letter of Sir R. Stopford to the Admiralty—Summons to the Governor—Report to the Admiral of the Capture of the Town—Excellent behaviour of the Allied Troops—Fortitude of a Negro Soldier—Return to the Camp at D’Jounie.

Some new idea had, however, been started in my absence; every body had his plan, and I am sure the Admiral must have been worried to death with the projects of the different people who had access to him; and on the morning of the 24th he informed me by letter that the attack on Sidon was given up for another.

This new project was happily set aside; and, after dining with the Admiral, on the 25th, I took my leave, promising to be back in forty-eight hours with the garrison of Sidon, and received orders to the following effect:

This was followed up by a precautionary letter:

84At midnight we left Beyrout with the Gorgon and Cyclops, having a battalion of marines, 500 strong, under Captain Morrison, and a Turkish battalion of like force, commanded by Kourschid Aga. My broad pennant was on board the Gorgon, which, by the bye, was quite irregular, as a blue pennant cannot be moved, and any Captain might have objected serving under it, unless appointed to the ship where it was flying. The general printed instructions provided a remedy, by authorizing the Commander-in-Chief to substitute a red pennant, which, however, the Admiral, for reasons of which I am not aware, did not think proper to do.

At daylight next morning, the castles of Sidon, the twin sister of Tyre, the emporium of commerce in days gone by, appeared above the horizon, and the squadron under Captain Berkeley close at hand, anxiously expecting our arrival. Seeing no mountaineers at Damour, we pushed on at once to Sidon, which was summoned, and, on receiving no answer by eleven o’clock, the attack began, the description of which I give in my letter to the Admiral, together with his to the Admiralty:

Half the garrison were immediately embarked, and arrived at Beyrout the same evening, thus keeping our word to the Admiral twenty-four hours sooner than we had promised.

In taking a town by storm, much confusion necessarily arises, accompanied by plunder and other barbarities, but to the honour of the Marines, the Austrians, and the Turks, I believe there never was an occasion where less blood was spilt, or disorder easier put an end to, which was to be attributed in a great degree to the exertions and excellent arrangements of Captain Berkeley (to whom I gave command of the town,) assisted by the Archduke and the Captains of the squadron.

Souliman Pacha’s family embarked in a French steamer before the attack began; his house, situated in one of the positions first assailed, I regret suffered much, in spite of all the efforts of the officer to save it.

93Next morning many wounded Egyptians were found in various parts of the town, and it was extraordinary to see the patience with which they endured their sufferings; a black man I particularly observed, with his leg broken, lying in a corner without uttering a murmur, though he appeared in much pain: a shutter was procured, on which he managed to place himself, holding the wounded leg with both hands, (for he would not accept assistance,) and in this manner he was safely carried to the hospital. In the afternoon I embarked the remainder of the garrison, and returned to D’Jounie Bay, after an absence of forty-eight hours, leaving a battalion of Turks in the town, and the squadron under Captain Berkeley.

State of Affairs at D’Jounie—Effect of the Capture of Sidon—The Emir Bechir Cassim joins the Allies—Overtures from the Emir Bechir—Movements of Ibrahim Pacha—Capture of Caiffa, and of Tyre; Captain Collier’s Report—Conflicting opinions as to future Operations—Letter from Sir R. Stopford—Insufficient boating of War Steamers.

On the following morning I examined our positions, and found the enemy had again established themselves on the heights of Boharsof, and set fire to the habitations of the mountaineers of that district, (who had assisted in the first attack,) and driven their wives and families across the Nahr-el-Kelb, to Antoura, Argentoun, and the adjacent villages. War at all times is the parent of misery and destitution, and in this instance I found none of its horrors alleviated; it was heart-rending to see the unfortunate women and children encamped under trees in the mountains, without the means of subsistence, and on our part, without being able to offer them much relief.

The effect of taking Sidon soon began to show itself. Hitherto the Chiefs on the Mountain had not much confidence in our operations. Beyrout was still in the possession of the enemy, and they 95could not understand how a defenceless town could hold out against a powerful squadron, but when they heard of the capture of Sidon, their eyes began to open.

The Emir Bechir Cassim, the next in succession to the old Emir Bechir, found means to escape with a few horse from the neighbourhood of Beyrout, and joined our camp, and the old Emir sent me a message by a priest, with a request to meet one of his emissaries at our advanced posts after dark, and he proposed the following terms:

1. Secresy: granted.

2. That he should retain his government, and be guaranteed by the Four Powers.

This, I said, was inadmissible, that his Firman was here confirming him in his government, and it depended on himself.

3. That he should be allowed time to withdraw his sons and grandsons from Ibrahim Pacha before he declared himself. This I thought reasonable, and acceded to it, with the understanding that I was to see a beginning as soon as possible.

I had no great confidence in this prince, as he had deceived me before; and it was arranged that the Firman of the Porte should be given to the Emir 96Bechir Cassim, in the event of his not presenting himself at the appointed time. This prince, after staying a few days at D’Jounie, where he was well entertained, proceeded to take the command of the mountaineers who were watching the movements of Ibrahim and Osman Pacha at Merouba. When the former heard of the loss of Sidon, he was confounded, and immediately marched a part of his forces on Ibteddeen, the residence of the prince, for the double purpose of securing his fidelity, and endeavouring to recapture Sidon. On hearing of Ibrahim’s departure, I reinforced Captain Berkeley, who commanded at Sidon, with a battalion of Turks, and shortly after with one of marines; this cooled Ibrahim’s courage, and after staying a few days with the Emir, he set out for Beyrout, to concert measures with Souliman.

On the 29th of September, the Pique arrived with the accounts of the capture of Caiffa and Tyre, by that active officer, Captain Collier, who wrote as follows:

The most difficult part of my task was to contend against the conflicting opinions of officers, both English and Turks; every man had his notions; one wanted one plan of operations, another a different one, each person very naturally thinking the part of the coast he had been employed upon the best to occupy, without having the smallest knowledge of what was going on in the mountains. No sooner was the Pique arrived than the Admiral wrote to me:

I plainly saw that the Admiral was tormented with the conflicting opinions of those who had access to him, and who gave him the most absurd reports. At one moment the enemy were said to be advancing upon us with 20,000 men, though there was a deep ravine between us which could only be crossed at one or two places, and those places watched; at another moment it was said I was preparing to march the troops into the interior of the country without even consulting the Commander-in-Chief; this was deliberately communicated to him by an officer, without having the smallest foundation, and a strong letter was actually written to me on the 105subject, and which letter would have been sent had not Captain Berkeley, who happened to be on board the flag ship at the time, assured the Admiral that there was not one word of truth in it.

It was necessary to be patient and persevering, and I wrote to the Admiral that I was sorry to find that he had decided not to undertake any further operations, because, in that case, I feared that all we had already done would be lost, and I felt quite satisfied, were we to go away without taking Beyrout, which would free the country from Souliman and Ibrahim Pacha, all the arms we had issued would fall into their hands; that the family of Emir Haider, who was a prisoner in Egypt, had decided to declare for the Sultan, the moment they could get rid of Ibrahim and procure arms, and that I saw no means of doing this but by taking Beyrout; that it was impossible to cross Dog River and attack Ibrahim with Souliman on my right and Osman Bey in front. The latter might be surprised, but it must be done by troops who could march well, because it would not do to be long absent from our camp. To which the Admiral replied in the following terms:

In all our expeditions with steam-vessels we found great difficulty in landing troops, from the insufficient manner in which the steamers are boated, and we were obliged to take the line-of-battle ships’ boats to enable us to land a sufficient number of men; and I take this opportunity of strongly recommending the paddle boats invented by Capt. G. Smith, particularly for steam vessels on military excursions.

Destruction of Stores at Beyrout—Intermeddling of Izzet Pacha—Correspondence between the Author and Sir R. Stopford—Visit to Tyre and Sidon, and Reconnoissance of Acre.

On the 2nd of October an Egyptian gunner deserted to the Hastings, at Beyrout, and gave information that a train was laid along the bridge to the eastern castle, in which there was a considerable quantity of powder, and he offered to accompany a party to cut the train and seize the powder. Commander Worth, in one of the Hastings’ boats, volunteered this dangerous service, and, protected by the launch and pinnace of the Edinburgh, and covered by the fire of the ships, landed on the bridge, under a heavy fire of musketry, cut off the train, then got into the castle, brought off 31 barrels of powder, and threw over the walls about 60 or 70 more. This service was not performed without loss: Mr. Luscomb, a midshipman of the Hastings, was killed, the Egyptian, and two seamen of the Hastings, and one of the Edinburgh, wounded. In the afternoon another landing took place, under Commander 109Hastings, of the Edinburgh, and they brought off six cases and one barrel, and threw a great number over the walls. On this occasion there was only one man wounded. Though these expeditions were successful, it showed the enemy were alive, and the loss met with put another damper on the attack of Beyrout.

Izzet Pacha, a meddling and savage old Turk, without capacity, had been appointed Governor of Syria; hitherto he had been quiet, but as things began to brighten he began to meddle, and urged me to march on Merouba and attack Osman Pacha, not considering that by so doing we exposed ourselves to be attacked by Souliman, who was within four hours’ march of our position; he also proposed to abandon Sidon, which had been captured only a few days before; in this he was supported by many who ought to have known better, and I was urged to undertake this Quixotic expedition merely to please the old Pacha. This I peremptorily refused; he then sent Admiral Walker to Sir Robert Stopford to urge him to attempt it, and he wrote to me on the subject:—

To this I made answer as follows:

112This affair was in consequence given up, and I proceeded in the Hydra to Sidon, which I found Captain Berkeley had put in a good posture of defence; he accompanied me to Tyre, which was under the protection of Captain Collier; and I found it a very unfit place to put a force on shore for the winter, being only fifteen miles from Acre, where there was a strong garrison, possessing every material requisite to drive us out, should the squadron be obliged to quit the coast. From Tyre we went on to Acre, which was closely reconnoitred, but not without receiving a salutation from the batteries; only one shot took effect, but did no damage.

In the evening I returned to D’Jounie, bringing back the marine battalion, perfectly satisfied, as were all who accompanied me, that Acre presented no difficulties that could not be overcome, when the proper time arrived for attacking it.

Osman Pacha defeated by the Emir Bechir Cassim at Merouba—Proposed Attack on Beyrout—Correspondence with Sir Robert Stopford—Letter from the Emir Bechir Cassim—Letters to Lords Minto and Palmerston—Visit to the Encampment of the Emir Bechir Cassim—Comfortless quarters at Argentoun—Return—Preparations for the Attack of Beyrout.

I was much pleased, on my return, to find the Emir Bechir Cassim, taking advantage of Ibrahim having weakened his forces before Merouba, had attacked Osman Pacha, defeated him, taken between 400 and 500 prisoners, and obliged him to retire on Basquinta, at the head of the Nahr-el-Kelb. It now became absolutely necessary to act with vigour, and I again brought Beyrout under the Admiral’s consideration, and was glad to find he approved of it, and he wrote to me as follows:—

This looked like business, and I lost no time in replying as follows; an opportunity offering, I also wrote to Lords Minto and Palmerston:—

The following are my letters to the Earl of Minto and Viscount Palmerston.

120After a very fatiguing journey of eight hours, I found the Prince encamped in a glen surrounded by the most rugged and savage rocks, perched on the top of which were many mountaineers to prevent surprise. From 1500 to 2000 men were in the camp, dressed in the gay costume of the Mountain. The Prince himself was in a small tent, surrounded by his Emirs and Scheiks, and received me with the greatest kindness. After complimenting him on his victory, through the medium of my interpreter, the tent was cleared, and I pointed out to him the plan of operations I meant to pursue to gain possession of Beyrout, which he quite approved of, and promised his cordial co-operation the moment he was supplied with ammunition and provisions, which the Turkish Commissary was most negligent in doing; they were almost in a starving state, a few goats being all they could procure in the mountains, and the horses were entirely without barley. After staying an hour, we returned to Argentoun; the road was strewed with dead and dying Egyptians, some of them stark naked, and it was with the utmost difficulty I could persuade the mountaineers to assist in getting the poor wretches crammed into a small cottage on the 121road-side; they did not put the prisoners to death, but they stripped them, and left these poor creatures to die of cold and want.

At Argentoun we did not find our quarters at all improved since our last visit; in addition to the bed-fellows we had to encounter, we were obliged to turn in supperless; having calculated on getting back to the camp the same night, we brought no provisions with us, and not even an egg was to be had for love or money. Next morning, at daylight, we were on horse, and by noon arrived at D’Jounie.

On the morning of the 7th I sent a battalion across the Nahr-el-Kelb to support some of the mountaineers who had collected there, and other preparations were made to move on Beyrout by sea and land. The Grand Prince was also directed to cross higher up, and to keep me regularly informed of all his movements.

March towards Beyrout—Apprehensions of the Admiral—Arrangements in case of Disaster—Letters to and from the Emir Bechir Cassim—Skirmish—Position at Boharsof—Omar Bey dispatched to join the Emir—Letter to the Admiral—Arrival of Sir Charles Smith—The Author ordered to return to the Camp.

On the 8th (October) General Jochmus marched out of his position with four Turkish battalions, and occupied Ornagacuan, pushing his advanced posts as far as Boharsof, opposite to which, on the hills above, commanding a winding road, were observed a few of the enemy’s light troops. In the evening the Admiral became alarmed at our intended movement, and wrote as follows:—

I felt so confident that the arrangements I had made must succeed, and had received from Souliman Pacha’s aide-de-camp, who came over to us, such information about the position of the enemy’s army, who were much disheartened, that I did not at all enter into the Admiral’s apprehensions, and wrote to him that I had received most satisfactory information from the aide-de-camp, and that he might rely upon it I should do nothing rash, or move till 124assured all was right; that two hours would bring us all back, and Ibrahim must march very quick if he could beat steam.

At daylight on the 9th, I sent an Arab battalion, composed of Egyptian deserters, to join General Jochmus, and shortly after I left my head-quarters at D’Jounie, and arrived on the heights of Ornagacuan at nine. The Princess Charlotte proceeded in tow of a steamer to Beyrout, and two others with a marine and Turkish battalion to St. George’s Bay, to keep Souliman in check; in our lines were left four battalions, and the sick and convalescents took charge of the camp at D’Jounie. In the event of disaster, or meeting a very superior force in front, it would have been impossible to have repassed Dog River, I therefore sent directions to Captain Austin, of the Bellerophon, who flanked its mouth, to fill up the road that had been broke up leading from Beyrout; and I made my arrangements to retire to the convent and heights above the river, gain the road, and cross at its mouth, under cover of the Bellerophon. This could have been effected with little loss.

Before leaving D’Jounie, I wrote to the Prince Cassim as follows:—

Soon after this was dispatched, came a letter from the Emir:—

So far all appeared right; there had been a little skirmishing with the mountaineers, but we had no idea that an enemy of any force was at hand, and were very comfortably seated in the convent at Ornagacuan, enjoying a tolerable breakfast after our long ride. During our repast, the firing became brisker and nearer, and before we were quite finished, a priest came in with the intelligence that the enemy were in our position. General Jochmus, who had been out in the morning, was incredulous; but I thought it high time to beat to arms, get on horse, and see what was going forward. By this time the fire was very sharp; and when I got near the advanced posts, I found sure enough they had been driven in, and the enemy’s skirmishers were actually in our position. No time was to be lost; two Turkish battalions advanced en tirailleur, 127and another in column, supported by two others and the Egyptian battalion, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance, we succeeded in driving them back. Our position was along a high mountain, with a deep ravine on each side. Towards the end of the position there was a considerable descent; another mountain rose at nearly right angles, the ravine to the left went round it, but to the right it finished, and a circuitous road led from the foot of the mountain, and conducted to its summit, where we discovered a strong body of Egyptians covering another column, who were retiring along the road I have mentioned. This first position was commanded by another, and it again by a third, the approach to them nearly perpendicular; another road led from the first position to Bechfaya. The appearance of this unexpected force, and the strength of the ground, rather staggered me, and after examining it with great attention, and consulting Colonel Hodges, an old Peninsular warrior, and the other officers under my command, I decided that nothing could be done by an attack in front, unless assisted by the Emir Bechir, who had not yet made his appearance; and I felt satisfied, that as the enemy had not pushed 128forward when they had actually got into our position, I had nothing to fear now we were aware of their force, and prepared to meet them.

In the evening the Emir wrote as follows to General Jochmus:—

This intelligence was not very pleasing; it would be impossible for them to arrive in the rear of the Egyptians before the afternoon of the 10th, even if they met with no opposition and used their best exertions, and this would have given another day for Ibrahim and Souliman to concert a movement. I 129was, however, determined to keep my ground, and I desired Jochmus to order Omar Bey, who had been left in our position, to march on Argentoun, cross over Dog River, and endeavour to form a junction with Emir Bechir. This was a very dangerous movement, the pass was difficult, and if discovered in the act of crossing, the consequences would have been serious. Omar Bey was, however, a good soldier; I placed full confidence in him, and I wrote to the Emir Bechir as follows:—

At day-light on the morning of the 10th, I observed the English Consul’s flag flying in Beyrout, and a brisk communication going on between the 130ships and the town; that, and the steam-boats moving from St. George’s Bay, led me to believe, that Beyrout was evacuated, and that Souliman Pacha was concentrating his troops to attack my right, while Ibrahim, who we ascertained was our opponent, attacked my front; under these circumstances it was not a pleasing sight to see the Turks and marines, who were stationed in St. George’s Bay for the express purpose of watching Souliman, removed to take possession of an abandoned town, thus leaving my right quite exposed, and I wrote to the Admiral, giving him an account of my position as follows:

I had heard a report of Sir Charles Smith’s arrival, but I did not apprehend he would assume the command till after the performance of the service now in progress. Shortly after dispatching 132this letter, however, I received two from the Admiral, dated the day before, which prepared me to expect an order to retreat; they were as follows:—

This was followed up as I expected, by another from the Admiral.

Impossibility of immediately retiring—Letter to the Admiral—His Answer—Arrival of the Emir—Advance upon the Enemy—Doubtful character of the Forces on both sides—Novelty of the Author’s situation—Battle of Boharsof—Defeat and Flight of Ibrahim—An awkward Mistake—A Green Egyptian Flag taken, and said to be lost again—Promptitude of Omar Bey—Turkish mode of Rejoicing—Second Letter of Recall—Note to the Admiral—Letter respecting the Author’s return to D’Jounie—Official Report of the Battle of Boharsof.

Our movements were however begun, and a retreat impossible, without compromising both the Prince and Omar Bey; I therefore decided on going on, and sent orders to our camp to hurry up the two remaining battalions to occupy Ornagacuan, and secure our right when we began the attack: and I ordered a battalion to cross over a deep ravine, ready to turn the enemy’s left when we attacked in front. This latter movement, from the procrastination natural to Turks, was not executed till several hours after the order was given.

As we every moment expected to hear of an attack on the enemy’s rear, the answer to the Admiral’s last letter was simple enough. I subjoin it, and the reply which he made.

This was the Admiral’s reply:—

I had sent to Admiral Bandeira to request he would send up his rocketeers; but this the Commander-in-Chief would not permit.

I had no idea the Emir could possibly be up, or Omar Bey be able to form a junction with him, before sunset, and I calculated to attack at dawn of day on the 11th; but we had hardly finished a scanty repast, which the kindness of Captain Henderson, of the Gorgon, furnished us with, when a firing was heard in the direction we expected the Emir to advance; and shortly after, my trusty interpreter Misk rushed into the room with the welcome news that the Emir had arrived. This 138intelligence set all orders that had arrived, or that might arrive, at nought. The drums beat merrily to arms, the troops were put in motion, we mounted our steeds, and in a few minutes were at the advanced posts. The battalion that had been sent across the ravine to turn the enemy’s left, notwithstanding the delay, had made considerable progress as yet unopposed; and the two battalions that were ordered up from the lines, much against the wish of Izzet Pacha, were advancing rapidly on Ornagacuan.

The enemy’s position was very strong, and perhaps might have been considered unassailable. I knew little of the troops I commanded; many of them were Albanians; and both parties had been endeavouring to persuade each other to come over. Our friends advised them to bring over Ibrahim, (who the day before I had seen sitting under a green flag in the second position, and saluted him); and the enemy, on the other hand, recommended that the old Commodore should be brought over to them. All this was distinctly heard at the out-posts.

I was strongly posted on a narrow range of hills, both flanks well protected; in front of my position there was a considerable descent, at the bottom of which a narrow road led round the foot of another 139hill to the summit, which the enemy occupied in force; their first position was commanded by a second, still higher, and that again by a third.

It was rather a new occurrence for a British Commodore to be on the top of Mount Lebanon commanding a Turkish army, and preparing to fight a battle that would decide the fate of Syria; but the very novelty was exciting to a degree. I was in my glory; standing on an eminence, surrounded by the general officers and my own staff, I fancied myself a great “Commander,” and surveying the enemy, who had not quite so brilliant an appearance as the Scottish host, although I could not exclaim with Marmion,

yet I said to my friend Hodges:—“If we can get the Turks and mountaineers to mount that rugged hill, and Omar Bey attacks at the same time their rear, Ibrahim will get such a dressing as he never had before.”

140The troops being now assembled just out of musket-shot, two small field-pieces opened their fire, and pitched their shot into the position where the Albanians were posted; the armed peasantry were directed to throw themselves among the rocks and work their way to the heights, and two Turkish battalions and the Arab battalion were in readiness, under cover of their fire, to advance along the winding road. The peasantry were rather shy, and required a good deal of coaxing, and occasionally a little manual persuasion, to get them forward, but, knowing the country, they took a long circuit on the enemy’s left, and advanced unseen to the heights without firing a shot; a Turkish battalion was now sent forward en tirailleur, and advanced with caution, but great gallantry, under a heavy fire, and they unexpectedly found much good cover under the rocks; a second battalion, headed by General Jochmus, was directed to advance along the road in column, but they broke into skirmishing parties; the Arab battalion was then brought up, but there was no keeping them together; they also broke into skirmishers, and the whole advanced with so much rapidity, (with the exception of some few, who I was obliged to stir up with my stick,) 141that I thought it best to keep my last battalion in reserve to cover their retreat in the event of disaster.

This was an anxious moment, for our success depended on the steadiness of the Turks when they came in contact with the enemy on the top of the hill, but it was soon over; the moment the hill was crowned the Turks ran in upon the Egyptians, the firing ceased, and the latter laid down their arms.

The reserve was now brought up, and the battalion which had crossed the gorge was making great progress on the enemy’s left.

The Egyptians kept up a heavy fire from their second position, and it was with some difficulty I succeeded in persuading the troops to renew the attack; but the example of Selim Pacha, General Jochmus, Lieutenants Bradley and Duncan, Mr. Pearn, Captain Loué, and the other Turkish officers, who all behaved well, encouraged them to storm the second position, which was carried in less than half an hour. It now became a complete rout, the enemy dispersed in all directions, leaving their baggage, ammunition, and provisions behind. Night put an end to the pursuit. Ibrahim, who commanded, escaped with a few men, leaving between 600 and 700 prisoners behind.

142Our Arab battalion, seeing a Turkish force advancing, took them for the enemy, and lined a wall that had been thrown up to resist Omar Bey; he on the other hand, took them for Ibrahim’s troops, and seeing myself and several officers with them, thought we were prisoners. A sharp fire was now opened on both sides, and it was with some difficulty I put an end to the conflict, which might have been attended with serious consequences.

A green flag was taken, which General Jochmus informed me afterwards was lost, but I am disposed to think it had been improperly concealed by some one instead of being brought to head-quarters. Our loss was not more than 50 killed and wounded, that of the enemy was never ascertained; their force was from 3000 to 4000 men. The greatest praise is due to Omar Bey, who marched the moment he got his orders on Argentoun, descended unseen into the gorge of Dog River by a narrow and rugged path, where he would have been annihilated had he been discovered, and although he got no intelligence of the Prince, pushed on and commenced his attack.

We now re-assembled the troops, which was no easy matter, and returned to Ornagacuan ready to face Souliman in the morning, leaving Omar Bey 143with his two battalions in possession of the field of battle.

The Turks after any success are fond of discharging their arms, caring very little whether they load with ball or blank, and I verily believe I run more risk of being shot as I returned to my quarters by the Turks than I did in the attack on Ibrahim’s position.

On my arrival on the coast I found the following orders from the Admiral:

144I was happy to be able to send the following short letter in reply:—

Next morning I addressed the Admiral again respecting my return to D’Jounie.

The following is my official report to the Admiral of the action of the 10th of October, penned, as will be seen, after my return to my ship:—

Necessity for disobeying the Orders to return to D’Jounie—Advantageous results—Difference with Izzet Pacha—his Character—Unmolested retreat of Souliman Pacha—he should have been closely followed up—Letter from the Admiral—The Author resigns the Command—Letter to Lord Ponsonby—Unsuccessful attack on Tortosa.

It is necessary in war, and I think quite justifiable, to take responsibility on oneself in unforeseen cases, running of course the risk of answering for the consequences; it is more dangerous, however, to disobey orders; but there are instances in which events may justify such disobedience; the reader will judge whether what I have related may be considered one of them.

I saw clearly that the Admiral was not at all aware of the critical position in which I was placed. When I left D’Jounie it was with the intention of joining the Grand Prince, and attacking Souliman Pacha, who was encamped before Beyrout, leaving four battalions in our position, to secure it against an unforeseen attack. On my arrival on the heights of Ornagacuan, I was as much surprised to find 153myself in front of Ibrahim, as I suppose he was to find himself opposed to me; he was evidently collecting troops to attack D’Jounie, which he ought to have done long before, and we were collecting ours to attack Souliman. Finding ourselves unexpectedly opposed to each other, it was distinctly my game to attack him before his force was assembledassembled. Had I obeyed the orders that were sent me to return to D’Jounie I should have had a most difficult and dangerous retreat, and been harassed by an enemy to whom we should have restored confidence. It would have been impossible to have sent timely notice to Omar Bey or the Prince, both of whom would have been sacrificed, the Turks would have lost confidence, and as the season was fast advancing I have no doubt the whole would have been re-embarked, and the expedition entirely failed. What, on the contrary, happened? the ships going to Beyrout, and my advance, caused the abandonment of the town; the victory, the dispersion of Ibrahim Pacha’s army, and, as will be shortly seen, the disorganization of the Egyptian troops, and the retreat of Souliman.

On the morning of the 11th Izzet Pacha joined me, and shortly after I received information that 1542000 of Souliman’s soldiers had deserted; I immediately put the troops in motion, intending to march on him, having had no information that he had decamped; to this Izzet objected; the old man was afraid of being left at D’Jounie, and insisted on two battalions being sent there. I offered him one for his protection; this did not satisfy him; he invented all sorts of stories,—first, that Ibrahim was again collecting his forces, and was advancing,—and many others of the same nature; and when he found I was inexorable, he said the weather was changing and the troops would all get wet. This was quite true; we had not seen a cloud the whole summer, but now the sky became overcast, and there was every appearance of a storm; I, however, observed to old Izzet that I never understood that a shower of rain was a sufficient reason to prevent an attack upon an enemy’s camp. The troops were ordered to march, and Izzet returned to D’Jounie, and on announcing his approach by firing his pistols in the usual way, one went off by accident and wounded him in the leg; it is a pity it had not gone through his head, for never was there a more unfit man to govern a country than the man in question: he had once 155before lost a Turkish army by starvation, had cut off his own wife’s head, and was a notorious tyrant and savage; and this was the man chosen to govern the Syrians. Representations were made to the Porte, and they very wisely recalled him.

On my arrival at the beach I found Souliman had decamped during the night, leaving his artillery behind, removing, however, the day before, all his tent equipage near the town, without being at all molested.

Had intelligence been sent to me early on the 11th I should have had no difficulty in advancing on Souliman, and probably cutting off the greater part of his division, as well as preventing Ibrahim from retiring on Corneille and collecting his forces there; such a movement would have encouraged the advance of the mountaineers, instead of remaining in the neighbourhood of Basquinta and allowing Ibrahim and Souliman to retire quietly with a defeated army, and assemble at Zachle, a little above the plain of the Bekaa.

Before I went off to the flag-ship I received the following letter from the Admiral:—

Two battalions were sent back to the camp at D’Jounie, and the rest marched to Beyrout; and I 158went on board the flag-ship and of course resigned my command, after having held it one month. I then addressed the following letter to the Ambassador:—

159The day before I took Sidon, Captain Houston Stewart, with the Benbow, Carysfort, and Zebra, attacked Tortosa, but failed in consequence of the boats grounding on an unknown reef. Both officers and men displayed great gallantry, but his loss was severe. Subjoined is Captain Stewart’s letter to the Admiral on the subject:—

Interview of the Author with the Admiral and Sir Charles Smith—Returns to Beyrout—Urges various enterprises upon the Admiral, which are disapproved of—Correspondence with the Emir Bechir Cassim—Surrender of the old Emir Bechir—Retrospect of the Successes of the Expedition—Speculations as to the Attack upon Acre—Visit to the Emir at Ammanah—Scenery of Lebanon—Reconnoissance of Ibrahim’s Position—Letter to the Admiral—Conduct of the Turkish Authorities—Visit to the Emir’s Palace at Ibteddin—Accident to the Young Prince—Departure of the Squadron for Acre.

The day after the action of Boharsof I had an interview with the Admiral and Sir Charles Smith on board the Princess Charlotte. I then stated my opinion, that Ibrahim should be followed up to Zachle, but this opinion was ill received, and I retired with the determination of mixing no further with the military affairs.

After being confined for two days on board the flag-ship with a slight illness, the natural consequence of the excitement I had been in for a month too rapidly subsiding, I proceeded to D’Jounie Bay, where the Powerful and Admiral Walker were still at anchor, and after embarking all the troops 170and stores, returned to Beyrout. The weather had been threatening for some days, and after a few heavy squalls and a slight gale, which proved to us the insecurity of the anchorage, it again became fine. The troops were now stationed at Beyrout, Sidon, and Tyre, and everything indicated a cessation of active measures for the present; but Acre was still within the reach of the British fleet, and every officer looked forward with great anxiety for an attack on that celebrated fortress.

Tripoli was also in the hands of the Egyptians, as was Latakia, and I repeatedly urged the Admiral to allow me to proceed there, which was declined; he seemed to have resigned the military authority entirely, though I never understood that the firman given by the Porte to Sir Charles Smith, which was merely an authority over the Turkish officers, in any way superseded the power of the Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces by sea and land, as he styled himself.

On the 13th October, the Grand Prince arrived at Ammanah with the mountaineers, to watch Ibrahim and Souliman Pachas, who had intrenched themselves at Zachle and El Malaka, with upwards of 6000 men and seven field pieces; they had sent 171the sick, amounting to 1000, to Damascus. The advanced posts of the Grand Prince had fallen in with, and made prisoners, the Emir Meshud and two of his horsemen.

On the 16th the Emir wrote to me as follows:—

To this I replied:

The old Emir Bechir now considering the game up, quitted his palace at Ibteddin, and came into Sidon with a good escort. Captain Berkeley sent him to the Admiral at Beyrout. His property was guaranteed to him; and he was conducted, at his own request, to Malta, with his family. This Prince was very rich; and had managed to keep his place through all revolutions for many years; and if he lives, I have no doubt will succeed in regaining his authority.

A few days after this we received information that the Egyptian force at Tripoli, consisting of 4000 men, had evacuated the town and blown up the magazine in the castle, without, however, damaging the city. It was soon after taken possession of by the mountaineers, and the Egyptians retired by the road of Balbeck, destroying the villages in their retreat. About the same time, Latakia and the passes of Adana were abandoned, the garrisons retiring on Aleppo. Had a little more 173energy been used by us, the greater part of these troops must have fallen into our hands.

I believe history does not record such unexampled successes gained in so short a time by so small a force. We landed on the 10th of September, at D’Jounie, with 5300 Turks, 1500 marines, and about 100 Austrians; by the 10th of October we had managed to storm and take Sidon, defeat the Egyptians at Ornagacuan, Ibrahim Pacha at Boharsof, and what between prisoners and deserters, get possession of 10,000 men, had freed all Lebanon, and forced Ibrahim to withdraw his troops from Tripoli and Latakia, abandon the passes of the Taurus, and concentrate the whole of his army at Zachle and Damascus.

Seeing no further prospect of active operations, I turned my attention, in common with my brother officers, to the propriety of an immediate attack on Acre, which I had thoroughly reconnoitred, and felt satisfied that the ships, in a very short time, would drive the Egyptians from the guns, if there was a possibility of approaching within a moderate distance of the walls. The subject was frequently raised on board the Princess Charlotte and discussed; but whether the Commander-in-Chief was 174restricted by orders from home, or was afraid of the lateness of the season, I am not aware, but certainly much valuable time was lost. The weather is generally, throughout the Mediterranean, good during the month of October; and after the little breeze we had, there is what is called on the coast of Syria, an autumnal summer for six weeks. On the 24th, Admiral Walker was despatched off Acre with several Turkish ships-of-war to make a demonstration, and I believe to summon the place; he was there joined by the Revenge, Thunderer, and Pique; they refused to receive the flag of truce, and Admiral Walker stood in and fired a few broadsides; but whether the Egyptians either did not think it worth while to return the fire, or had still some respect for the Sultan’s flag, they took no hostile notice whatever of this movement. Admiral Bandeira, who commanded the Austrian squadron, I believe was also anxious to attack Acre, and thinking it possible that the Egyptians might surrender to Admiral Walker, very wisely followed him with his small squadron. I had obtained leave to pay a visit to the Emir Bechir at Ammanah, and set out at daylight of the 25th, quite convinced that all hope of attacking Acre was at an end; but when 175I got half way up the mountain, to my utter astonishment I observed the Princess Charlotte, and all the squadron under weigh, with the exception of the Powerful. This sudden movement, I presume, was occasioned by the Austrian Admiral starting without orders; and, I suppose, the same reasons that induced Bandeira to follow Admiral Walker, induced the Commander-in-Chief to follow Bandeira; but feeling convinced that nothing serious was intended, I pursued my ride through the beautiful mountains of Lebanon to the Grand Prince’s head-quarters.

I have travelled in Switzerland and in the Tyrol, and admired the romantic scenery that you meet with in these fine countries; but still I give the preference to Mount Lebanon. The whole country is one mass of rocks heaped one on the other; and every spot of land, capable of cultivation, is supported by terraces, and irrigated by streams of water from springs, which are abundant in the mountain. On these terraces the mulberry-tree is cultivated with great care, and grows with much luxuriance. Fruit and vegetables of every description are grown in great abundance. The mountains produce only a sufficient quantity of grain for 176three months’ consumption; the other nine months are supplied either from the plains of the Bekaa, or by importation. The roads throughout the mountain are purposely bad, to render the passage of artillery impracticable. This assists the mountaineers in the defence of their country. The mountain passes are strong, and if bravely defended by peasants alone, no army, ever so well-disciplined, could obtain possession of them without immense loss. On approaching Ammanah, we descried armed peasantry stationed on the various heights to prevent surprise; and on our arrival at the court-yard of the châteauchâteau in which the Grand Prince was lodged, some hundreds of men were lounging about in the gay attire of the mountains, armed at all points. Many horsemen were also in the court-yard, ready to be despatched to any point whence an attack might be apprehended.

On entering the château, which certainly had not much the appearance of the residence of a Prince, I was immediately ushered into his presence. The old man was sitting cross-legged smoking his pipe, but immediately rose and embraced me with much warmth, calling me his friend, his protector and master; praising, with much apparent warmth, 177the English, who had come to release the mountaineers from the oppression of Mehemet Ali. Pipes and coffee were then produced, and after puffing away for a few minutes, the room was cleared, and an interpreter sent for. The Prince informed me that he had with him 3500 men; that he was ill-supplied with provisions and ammunition; that he had constantly written to the Pacha, but received neither answer or supplies; that the mountains were too poor to victual his men; and that they would shortly be obliged to go to their homes, and leave the country exposed. Ibrahim Pacha, had collected 15,000 men, including 3000 cavalry, at Zachle and Malaka, the former above the plain, the latter in it, and he could again enter the mountains when he pleased. He wished to be reinforced by three Turkish battalions, and he would then answer for preventing Ibrahim coming again into Lebanon; or if he were supplied with 5000 stand of arms, he could arm the Druses, and would require no more troops.

As I was anxious to see Ibrahim’s position, the Prince supplied me with fresh horses and an escort, some of whom had just come over from the enemy; and we proceeded over the mountain, which was 178well guarded by men, both on horseback and foot, perched in different positions, to give notice of Ibrahim’s movements. An hour brought us in sight of Zachle, which is on the edge of the hill. There appeared a few intrenchments thrown up, but I did not think it prudent to descend, not being provided with the best horses, and having reason to believe that Ibrahim’s cavalry would have no difficulty in cutting us off, should we approach too near his den; besides, I was not sure of my escort, who could very easily have delivered me up to Ibrahim, and as many of them had only been a few days in the service of the Prince, I did not feel myself particularly comfortable. After a pleasant ride of a couple of hours we returned to the Emir’s quarters, where there was a very tolerable repast prepared for us; we found a good appetite, far preferable to the best sauces supplied by Gunter in London, or the gourmand at Paris. We retired at an early hour, but neither to sleep nor rest; our bedfellows were troublesome, and seemed to think they had a good right to a share of the dinner furnished us by the Prince.

At daylight we started on our return, and taking the road of Corneille, passed the coal-mines at which 179Mehemet Ali obliged the poor Syrians to work, almost without pay, and proceeded to Salima, a town situated in a rich valley, the capital of the province of Mitten; we then ascended the mountain to Brumanah, and got back to Beyrout before sunset.

I was still anxious about the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, and I desired the Medea to get her steam up, and wrote to him the following letter:—

182The Admiral only proceeded as far as Sidon, where he fell in with Admiral Walker and the Austrian squadron. The former went back to Acre for a day or two, and the two admirals returned to Beyrout.

The Turks had already began their old practices, of treating the mountaineers with the most perfect contempt; and they were beginning to doubt very much whether their condition would be changed for the better. Old Izzet Pacha did not conceal his desire to get rid of the Grand Prince, and place himself in his palace at Ibteddeen.

As active operations seemed now entirely at an end, notwithstanding the reinforcements which were constantly arriving, some of whom were sent to Sidon and Tyre, but none to the mountains, I obtained leave from the Admiral to pay a visit to the Grand Prince’s palace, and was accompanied by his nephew, a fine young man of about twenty-two, and next heir to the government of Lebanon. After a long ride of eight hours, through a most beautiful mountainous country, we arrived at Deir el Kammar, the capital of Lebanon, a tolerably well-built small town; as the plague was said to exist there, we passed on without entering it, and on rounding a 183projecting cliff the palace of the Prince opened to our view; it is situated half way up the mountain, and has a very grand appearance; above it stands another palace, smaller than the first, and the houses of two of the Emir’s sons,—they were all in an unfinished state; the large palace had been, originally constructed in wood, but the late Emir had been many years employed in converting it into a more solid shape. The entrance into the courtyard is very strong, and capable of resisting anything but artillery, which could not easily be brought against it; the court-yard is large, and surrounded by a high wall, and in the time of the late prince several hundred armed men were constantly kept in the barracks adjoining, and a body of horse, richly caparisoned in the Eastern style, were always ready in the yard. Some of the rooms are handsome, particularly those of the harem, but mostly unfurnished, the Emir having removed everything he could to Sidon, and from thence to Malta. The stables were large and capable of containing five hundred horses, the greater part of which were gone; the Emir’s stud had been magnificent, and although the whole of his property was guaranteed to him, many of the best horses fell into the hands of the 184Turks. We were well received by some of the family who remained, and tolerably well entertained, but even in the palace of the Grand Prince of Lebanon our slumbers were much disturbed by the occupants he had left behind. After dinner we visited the small palaces, which were also in an unfinished state, though built in a tasteful style. On looking at these palaces it was easy to account for the fidelity of the Emir Bechir to Mehemet Ali; the fact is, the old man plundered the inhabitants in the most atrocious manner, confiscated the estates, and put out the eyes of the Emirs he did not like; Mehemet Ali knew well the importance of keeping him faithful, and allowed him to do as he pleased in the mountain, and was content with a very small tribute, not exceeding 30,000 dollars a year.

After breakfast we took leave of our friends and proceeded to Beyrout, but a sad accident clouded our otherwise pleasant journey. The mountaineers are good horsemen, and fond of showing off whenever a little flat ground allows them to exhibit their dexterity in firing off their muskets and pistols and throwing the d’jerred at full gallop, reloading in an incredible short time. The young Prince and several of his attendants, seeing an 185opportunity for a display, set off at full gallop; one of his men, close behind him, amused himself by throwing his musket in the air, to show his dexterity in catching it; it unexpectedly went off, and shot out both the Prince’s eyes. The poor lad fell instantly from his horse, and when we came up he was, indeed, in a most pitiable condition: his eyes hanging out of their sockets, and streaming with blood; he himself, unconscious of what had happened, was pulling them out with his fingers, and it was with the greatest difficulty I could persuade him to desist, and allow them to be bandaged. What an awful visitation was this! a few minutes before, this youth was full of life and spirits, the heir to the ruling Prince, in one moment plunged into eternal darkness; it was a cruel sight. His poor attendant, who had accidentally done the deed, hung over him more dead than alive; the poor fellow seemed to suffer more than the Prince himself, who was nearly unconscious. We were three leagues from the first village, and with great difficulty succeeded in getting him there, carried in one of our cloaks. I rode on to Beyrout, and despatched an English surgeon to his assistance. His sight, as I expected, proved to be gone for ever; but youth, and the strength of his 186constitution, in a few months healed his wounds, and otherwise restored him to perfect health.

On my arrival at Beyrout, to my great astonishment, I found a steamer had arrived from England with orders to attack Acre. This was, indeed, a change for the better; there was now no further room for indecision. Orders were sent to Sidon to march 2000 Turks to the pass of the White Mountain, about eleven miles from Acre. Want of cavalry limited the operation of the land force to that movement, as it would not have been prudent to have exposed the Turkish troops to the Egyptian cavalry in a country where they could act. 3000 Turks, under Selim Pacha, small detachments of artillery, of sappers and miners, under Major Higgins and Lieutenant Aldrich, were embarked in the squadron. On the 30th the steamer started, and in the night, a breeze springing up, the squadron followed.

Letter of Congratulation from Lord Ponsonby to the Author—Ibrahim Pacha’s Standard, missing from the Field of Boharsof—Letters to Lord Ponsonby, Colonel Hodges, and the Admiral respecting it—Lord Ponsonby’s Speech to the Sultan, and Letter to the Author—Colonel Hodges’ Explanation—The Affair never satisfactorily cleared up.

Before leaving Beyrout, I received a letter from the Ambassador, dated October 22, congratulating me on the affair of Boharsof, and expressing a hope that we should follow up our successes. His Lordship was also very active in urging the Porte to send more arms and troops, and also to secure to the mountaineers all their rights and privileges, and remove that wicked and unprincipled old Turk, Izzet Pacha, which I had requested him to do.

By the same conveyance I received the Oriental Observer, in which paper it was stated that Colonel Hodges had arrived at Smyrna, with the green flag, under which I had seen Ibrahim Pacha reconnoitring our position, and which we took at Boharsof, and afterwards lost, as I was informed by General 188Jochmus; this rather puzzled me. I always thought there was a mystery about this flag, which never was in my possession, and which I never sent to Constantinople. How it got there demanded an explanation, and I accordingly wrote to Lord Ponsonby as follows:

190I also very naturally applied to Colonel Hodges:

A few days after this I received another letter from the Ambassador, acquainting me that he had presented the standard in question to the Sultan, in form, and made the following speech:

“Sire, I solicited the honour of an audience of your Imperial Majesty, that I might lay at the foot of your Majesty’s throne the standard taken in battle by your Majesty’s valiant troops, and sent to me from the officer who had the happiness to direct the 191action of those brave men in the glorious combat of the 10th of October.

“A few weeks since, some rebellious subjects of your Majesty boasted that the standard should be displayed before the capital of your empire. The standard is now here, a monument of the triumph of your Majesty’s arms, and an evidence of the error of those who proclaimed the weakness of the Sublime Porte, and the power of the Pacha of Egypt.”

His Lordship’s letter and his Lordship’s speech puzzled me more than the Oriental Observer. I began to doubt whether I had commanded the Turkish army, or had ever been on the heights of Boharsof at all, as I most certainly never sent this flag to Lord Ponsonby, and I again wrote to his Lordship for an explanation.

I also sent to the Admiral the following letter:

The Ambassador never thought proper to reply to either of my letters, and the only explanation I ever got was from Colonel Hodges, which I subjoin:

“As to the flag, I was the bearer of it to this place. I left Beyrout on Sunday evening. I called on Sir Charles Smith on the afternoon of that day, at his quarters on shore, when he asked me to take charge of despatches, and a flag, that I understood from him had been taken from the 2000 Egyptian troops that had surrendered the day before at Beyrout. This flag, with a parcel of red buntinbuntin flags, were sent by a sergeant of artillery to my boat, that was waiting to carry me to the Princess Charlotte. When I reached the ship the Admiral was on the quarter-deck; he asked me ‘What that flag was.’ I told him it was one that Sir Charles 195Smith had requested me to take to Lord Ponsonby. The Admiral replied, ‘It is I who ought to send that flag to Lord Ponsonby to present to the Sultan, and I shall write a despatch with it.’ This is all I know of the transaction.”

This did not explain Lord Ponsonby’s speech, and to this day it is a mystery. Now the flag was either sent or not; if sent, the person has managed to conceal it, and if it was not sent, then some one has bamboozled the Ambassador or the Ambassador bamboozled the Sultan. Here I shall let it rest, and carry the reader at once to St. Jean D’Acre, a place well known in ancient and modern history.

Former Sieges of Acre—Arrival of the Allied Squadron—Proposed mode of Attack—Objections—Survey of the North Channel—The Squadron under weigh—The Author attacks from the North—Conduct of the different Divisions—Explosion of the Grand Magazine—Close of the Action—Evacuation of the Town—Fate of the Sick and Wounded.

When Bonaparte sat himself down before Acre, in 1799, the fortress was not strong enough to resist a regular siege; his heavy guns had been captured by Sir Sydney Smith’s cruisers, and field artillery was not sufficient to open a practicable breach in the walls; there is, however, no doubt but it must have fallen had it not been for the bravery and exertions of Sir Sydney Smith, and the gallant officers and crews of the Tigre and Theseus, who obliged Bonaparte to raise the siege after having been before it two months. Had Bonaparte succeeded in capturing Acre the Grand Prince of Lebanon would have immediately declared for him, and it is difficult to say what then would have stopped his enterprising career.

197In November, 1831, Ibrahim Pacha anchored off Jaffa with an Egyptian squadron, and invested Acre in December; he must have been much favoured by the weather to have ventured on such a dangerous coast at that season of the year. Had a gale of wind set in, not a ship would have escaped; but fortune seems to have favoured all his undertakings up to the time the Allies landed in D’Jounie Bay. The Egyptian squadron attacked the south face of the works, and left their mark behind, which was still visible when the British squadron anchored; but little real damage was done to the fortress by their fire. The siege lasted six months; in that time 20,000 shells and 200,000 shots are said to have been thrown into the town, which ultimately surrendered for want of water.

After Acre fell into the possession of Mehemet Ali, he considered it of so much importance that vast numbers of labourers were employed to make it a fortress of the first order towards the land side, but when the squadron arrived before it, there still remained much to be done. It has two fronts to the sea, one to the westward, the other to the south.

The allied squadron anchored, on the afternoon of the 2nd of November, at some distance from 198the fortress towards Mount Carmel. The Revenge, Pique, and Talbot, had been off the port some time, and had made a tolerable accurate survey of the coast, and buoyed some shoals which were not known: and here I may remark that, though a British squadron had been there in 1799, the Admiralty had not been able to furnish us with anything like a correct plan of the fortifications and the soundings. The Consuls in the different parts of the world ought to be instructed to procure information, and if a little more attention were paid by the Foreign Office to these appointments no place where the British Consular flag waves would be unknown to the Government; these situations are generally filled up without the smallest regard to the capacity or fitness of the gentlemen who hold them, to which may be traced many of the disasters that have frequently befallen our expeditions, and more particularly our last to Egypt, from whence we were driven with great loss by Mehemet Ali.

After dinner I went on board the Princess Charlotte, where I met several officers of the squadron. I found the following plan of attack had been settled by Captain Boxer, of the Pique, to which the 199Admiral had acceded. We had before Acre four steamers, the Gorgon, Stromboli, Phœnix, and Vesuvius; they had been throwing shells into the town the day before. There were also seven line-of-battle ships, the Princess Charlotte, bearing the Admiral’s flag; the Powerful, bearing my broad blue pennant; the Bellerophon, Captain Austin; the Revenge, Captain Waldegrave; Thunderer, Captain Berkeley; Edinburgh, Captain Henderson; Benbow, Captain Stewart; and the Castor, Captain Collier; Pique, Captain Boxer; Carysfort, Captain Martin; Talbot, Captain Codrington; Wasp, Captain Maunsell; and Hazard, Captain Elliot.

Captain Boxer had observed that at daylight it was generally calm, the sea breeze not setting in till twelve o’clock, or thereabouts; he therefore proposed that three steamers should take the Princess Charlotte, Powerful, and Bellerophon in tow; the fourth the Admiral reserved for himself. These three ships were to anchor on the west face of the fortress of Acre; the steamers were then to return for the other line-of-battle ships, the smallest of which, the Benbow and Edinburgh, were to be placed on the south. This novel mode of attack certainly did not appear to me good, as I felt confident 200that it would require at least two hours after the three first ships were placed before the other three could be brought into action, and about as much more before the fourth, the Turkish line-of-battle ship, and the frigates and small craft could be in their stations, and that probably we should be beaten in detail. I ventured to express my doubts on the subject, but Captain Boxer assured me that he knew the place perfectly well, and as everything was settled with the Admiral, there was no necessity for my attempting to change anything, as he knew as much about battery work as I did. After making some further observations, in disapproval of the plan, I pointed out the propriety of the smaller ships leading, to enable the line-of-battle ships to place themselves sufficiently close without the danger of grounding, which is the common mode of attack, and more particularly necessary in a place very imperfectly known, and at that advanced season of the year. My opinion was, however, overruled, and I took my leave. Preparations were made during the night to anchor the ships by the stern, some with bowers, others with the sheet, or stream, according to the judgment of the several captains. I preferred the sheet anchor, and gave directions 201accordingly. At daylight next morning the steamers proceeded to their different ships to be lashed alongside; and after the most mature reflection, which in no way changed my opinion, I went on board the Princess Charlotte, I think with Captain Henderson, of the Vesuvius; there I also found Captain Henderson, of the Gorgon. I told the Admiral that I thought it my duty to say that I felt satisfied, if the present plan was persevered in, we should be defeated. I appealed to Captain Henderson, of the Gorgon, an experienced steam officer, to know whether, even allowing everything to go right, (which could not be expected,) he would be able, after having placed one ship, to return and place another in less than two hours, to which he replied, “he could not.” I also pointed out to the Admiral that, as the sea-breeze generally set in from the northward, we ought to wait till it was steady; and the ships destined to attack the west face should come in from the northward, where fewer guns would bear upon them, and where there was no spit running out to interrupt their progress as there was on the south point. The Admiral, I was glad to find, came into my views, and the steam-boat plan was abandoned.

202The only objection that could be started was the lateness of the hour before the sea-breeze set in, and in a conversation with Captain Fanshawe, that was the difficulty he raised, to which I observed, that it was a very reasonable objection, but still I was of opinion that a place like Acre should either be attacked properly, or not at all; and the masters of the Princess Charlotte and Powerful agreed with me, that it was much preferable sailing the ships in to towing them; and both these officers went on board the Vesuvius and reconnoitred the north channel, passing inside the shoal, which lay about three or four miles from the west face of the fortification. This passage they found perfectly safe, and few guns defending the approach from the northward. Our sheet cable had been improperly bent, being unshackled inside, and passed out of the stern port, round the bows, into the hawse hole, and reshackled, leaving the bight on board. I gave orders for remedying this inconvenience immediately and went on board the flag ship by signal. The breeze had sprung up from the southward, and it was then determined to attack from that quarter. The Powerful was to place herself on the S.W. angle, and the Princess Charlotte to pass 203ahead of her and anchor; the other Captains were not on board, but I concluded they had their instructions.

The general signal was now made to weigh, and on coming alongside the Powerful, to my dismay, in remedying the mistake that had been made in bending the sheet cable, they let the bight, which was through the hawse hole, go by the run, and the weight of the cable almost tore the anchor from the bows. All hands were sent on the lower deck to rouse in the slack of the cable, but the chock in the stern port had not been shipped, and all attempts to get a fathom of it were unavailing. By this time the squadron were under weigh, and we were obliged to leave the cable to its fate and weigh also, which was hardly done when the lashing of the anchor gave way, and the ship was brought up by the stern; there was nothing left but to cut away the cable and substitute the stream, which is by no means a safe way of bringing up a ship alongside of a battery.

I do not know that in the whole course of a long service I ever was before so annoyed; the whole squadron were under weigh, and the Powerful at anchor, without any person but ourselves being 204aware of the cause, and at a time when there was not a moment to be lost. The wind, however, died away, which gave time to get our stream anchor ready; and about one o’clock the proper sea breeze set in, and the Phœnix, on board of which were embarked Sir Robert Stopford and Sir Charles Smith, (though the flag was flying in the Princess Charlotte,) made the signal for the squadron to close round the Powerful. Captain Stewart, of the Benbow, who was to attack from the south, under the orders of Captain Collier, together with Castor, Edinburgh, Carysfort, Talbot, Wasp, and Hazard, thinking there was some mistake, very properly asked permission to attack from the south, which was granted. Shortly after, as we were standing to the northward to round the shoal, and give room for the squadron to follow, the signal was made to bear up, to which I replied, “Intend attacking from the north.” I believe the answer was not understood, and the Flag Lieutenant came on board to know what we were waiting for. I desired him to explain to the Admiral my intention. A few minutes after, the signal was made to the Revenge to keep under weigh as a reserve, much to the annoyance of my friend Captain Waldegrave.

205The Powerful, followed by the Princess Charlotte, Thunderer, Bellerophon, and Pique, having got well round the shoal, now bore up, and ran along shore towards the north angle. As we drew near the fortress, the colours were hoisted from two flag-staffs, one on the citadel, the other lower down. I desired the bow guns of the Powerful to be fired to prevent the Egyptians pointing with correctness. At this time the southern division, led in with great judgment and gallantry by Captain Collier, of the Castor, were fast approaching their position, and when well within range, the Egyptians opened their fire, the shot passing very considerably over. In a few minutes we passed the circular redoubt, where only three or four guns were mounted, and then anchored abreast of the sea wall, defended by forty guns, in six and a half fathom water, and about seven hundred yards distance. The wind was on the land, and we were not sure of our soundings further in; and had we been obliged to swing and veer, we might have tailed on shore; besides, it was the month of November, and fine weather was not to be expected to continue.

Captain Fanshawe, of the Princess Charlotte, 206supposing he was, under any circumstances, to take her station to the northward of the Powerful, which ship he thought would anchor on the S.W. angle, (as if she had come in from the south,) and believing we had brought up in consequence of shoal water, anchored astern of us, as did the Bellerophon. Captain Berkeley, seeing a sufficient opening, (and being under the same impression, and having the same orders as Captain Austin, to anchor in succession,) pushed in between the Princess Charlotte and Bellerophon. I was not aware of these orders, and I sent a boat, which arrived too late, to desire them to pass ahead of me. Perhaps I was wrong in not making a signal, but as the Commander-in-Chief was in the Phœnix, to direct the movements of the squadron, I did not think it proper.

As each ship anchored, a tremendous fire was opened, and the shot were so well directed, that the bravest men of the bravest nation in the world could not have resisted; no wonder, then, that the Egyptians were soon thrown into confusion. Five of their guns only, placed in a flanking battery, were well served, and never missed; but they were pointed too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only. The main-top-mast and mizen-top-sail yard were 207shot through on board the Powerful, and the rigging much cut; two shots only struck our hull, but did little or no damage. The ships astern suffered also in their rigging. One man was killed on board the Princess Charlotte, and the Thunderer had her quarter-gallery shot away.

The Admiral, seeing room ahead of the Powerful, made the signal for the Thunderer to weigh; but she was so jammed between the Princess Charlotte and Bellerophon, though she tried, it was impossible to move without fouling either one or other. Seeing this, and being apprehensive that the five guns which kept playing upon us would at last find their proper elevation, I first sent a boat, but before she reached, took upon myself to order the Revenge, who was in reserve, to anchor ahead of me, which Captain Waldegrave did in gallant style.

While this was going on on the west face, Captain Collier’s squadron, (the Castor anchoring first, and the others passing ahead of her,) were doing their work to admiration on the south, supported by the Austrians, under Admiral Bandeira. Nor was the fire of the Turkish Admiral to be slighted; he ran inside of all the squadron, and took up a warm 208berth abreast a new, and very strong work. Nothing could resist the fire of our ships; many of the shot from our side passed over the town, and might have much injured the ships to the south, unknown to us; and I fancy a few of their’s flew occasionally over us. The steamers outside were not idle; most of their fusees, however, were bad, and some fired shot instead; but still a few shells must have done execution. Ours in the Powerful, fitted agreeable to a plan of Mr. Jenner, gunner’s-mate of the Edinburgh, rarely failed; and I believe all those on his system did much good service.

After a most severe firing of upwards of two hours, the grand magazine blew up with a tremendous explosion; whether caused by accident, or by our shells, will never be known. Many ships, as in similar cases, claimed the credit of it. The Admiral gave it to the Gorgon; one of the captains of our shell-guns claimed it also; and I dare say there was not a captain of a shell-gun in the squadron who did not think that he had done the deed. But there let it rest; it was an awful visitation on the enemy. Many an unfortunate being finished his existence in the air; and 209many still more unfortunate were buried in the ruins or in the casemates, and probably lived for days, and perished from starvation or gradual suffocation, of all deaths the worse to die. The five guns I have mentioned, notwithstandingnotwithstanding the explosion, kept up their fire with great spirit to the last.

About sunset the signal was made to discontinue the engagement; but as that might have encouraged the enemy to re-man their guns, we kept on till a considerable time after dark, when the Flag Lieutenant brought us orders to withdraw. The Revenge slipped her stern anchor, and made sail with great facility. The Princess Charlotte, I believe, picked up both her anchors, and also made sail, but casting the wrong way, nearly got on shore; she was conducted in a most seamanlike manner, and not a word was to be heard on board of her. The Powerful, having her main-top mast badly wounded, and the main-top-gallant mast down, was towed out by the Gorgon. The Thunderer and Bellerophon remained in their position.

The southern squadron being anchored in the bay, with their stern to the beach, and their broadsides bearing on the Mole, remained at anchor also; and fortunately they did, for their position certainly 210contributed to decide the Governor to abandon the town, which he did after midnight, taking the greatest part of the garrison with him.

Towards the west side there was no breach, and the walls were much too high to surmount without scaling-ladders, which were left behind, with the exception of a few in the Princess Charlotte. Towards the south the walls were lower, but still they were not breached; and a determined enemy might have remained secure under the breastworks, or in the numerous casemates, without suffering much loss, and, considering the season of the year, it would have been worth their while to have made the experiment. Be that as it may, it was decided to evacuate the town. What number was withdrawn, and finally escaped, is difficult to say, as many deserted on the march and came over in the morning, and others were picked up by the irregular cavalry who had joined from the country. Before the attack on the fortress, a regiment of Egyptian cavalry, with their flying artillery, encamped outside, charged the mountaineers who had collected in some force; these, although they behaved with great gallantry, were quite unequal to resist the disciplined Egyptians, and suffered severely. The loss of 211the enemy’s force during the battle, by the explosion, must have been very great; an entire battalion, who were formed near the magazine ready to resist any attempt to storm, were entirely destroyed; and nothing could be more shocking than to see the miserable wretches, sick and wounded, in all parts of this devoted town, which was almost entirely pulverized. The Turks paid little attention to the poor creatures, and many were seen lying in all directions dying for want of seasonable relief.

Difference between the Admiral and the Author—The Author’s Orders—Captain Berkeley’s Orders—The Author applies for a Court Martial, but is refused—Correspondence with the Admiral—The Admiral’s Dispatches.

At daylight in the morning I went on board the Phœnix steamer, where the Admiral still was; he received me on the quarter-deck, and, after congratulating him on the capture of Acre, I said, I hoped he was satisfied with the position I had taken up. To which, to my great surprise, he replied, in a most abrupt manner, “Not at all! you ought to have gone on to the south-west angle.” Such a reproof on the quarter-deck of a man-of-war, and on such an occasion, given by the Commander-in-Chief to his second in command, even had he committed an error of judgment, cannot be justified, particularly after the services I had brought to so happy a termination on shore, and which had been frequently acknowledged by him.

That the squadron were not anchored so well as they might have been, is quite true, but no blame 213could be attributed to me, nor did I attribute any to others. When I attacked from the north I never doubted but the ships astern would pass on in the same manner as if I had attacked from the south, and anchor in a line ahead. But Captain Fanshawe, in the Princess Charlotte, as I have before stated, being impressed with the idea that, under any circumstances, he was to take his station astern of the Powerful, and believing we were in shoal water, anchored astern, as did the other ships who were under the same impression, and who had orders to anchor in succession, of which I was not aware. The Revenge, however, being in reserve, corrected the mistake.

I had frequently been engaged with batteries last war, and I believe was the only officer in the squadron who had ever commanded a ship in action against stone walls, and the system I followed was the one I had always been accustomed to; it was the plan followed by the leading ship at the battle of the Nile, and I am not aware that Lord Nelson found fault with Sir Samuel Hood for anchoring abreast of the leading ship; and if that is the tactics to be followed in attacking a line of ships, it is certainly the same that ought to be followed in attacking 214a line of stone walls. I never saw, in the whole course of my service, the leading ship run along a whole line of either ships or batteries; neither did I ever hear of such a thing. There are two palpable inconveniences attending such an attack; the first is, the leading ship would be disabled before she got to her station; the second, if the ships were in close order of battle, it would be perfectly impossible, in the smoke, for the next ship astern to know the exact moment her leader anchored, and she most probably would run aboard of her, and those astern would fall into the same difficulty. The fact is, the officers were not called on board of the flag-ship, and the plan of the place, and the plan of attack, under all circumstances, was never pointed out to them; each captain had separate instructions, and one did not know the orders of the other. I have before stated, that the first evening the attack was arranged between Captain Boxer and the Admiral, which I fortunately succeeded in changing. The officers were not sent for afterwards, for I went immediately on board my own ship, where I remained till my signal was made to go to the Admiral, (the breeze having sprung up,) who wished to ask my opinion, 215if we should attack, which was agreed upon; and I think Captain Fanshawe was the only captain there; I certainly never saw either Captain Austin or Captain Berkeley, nor did I know they were ordered to anchor in succession. The orders I received were as follows:

216What were the orders to the other Captains I did not know at the time. Captain Berkeley has since shown me a short note which he received the morning of the action:—

It is much to be regretted, after an attack, which succeeded beyond our expectations, that such an observation should have been made to me by the Commander-in-Chief; and I feel quite satisfied that some mischievous person had told the Admiral that the berth I took up had thrown out the rest of the squadron, or words to that effect.

That I was hurt, beyond measure, can be easily conceived. An admiral passing a censure after an 217action on his second in command was not to be borne with temper; some few words passed on both sides, which I do not recollect, and the conversation finished by my asking, in an abrupt manner, if he had any further commands for me, which was answered in the negative in the same style. I am not at all aware that I had ever given the least cause for this break-out. I certainly had frequently pressed the Admiral to carry on active measures, and perhaps in too urgent a manner, but I had no reason to expect that I should ever have been so treated.

On quitting the Phœnix I went on board the Gorgon, and took the only step open to me, namely, to ask for a court-martial. This was refused, and I had just finished a letter, requesting that the correspondence might be sent to the Admiralty if he persisted in denying me a court-martial, when I was beset by my brother officers, earnestly requesting that I would be pacified, very naturally concluding that a difference of so serious a nature between the Commander-in-Chief and his second, would put a stop to the promotion and rewards that it was expected would be liberally bestowed on the whole squadron. Of this I felt quite aware, but I considered myself 218so unjustly and so indecorously treated, and that my character as an officer would suffer, unless an investigation took place, as there are always people in the world ready to breathe upon one’s reputation.

This feeling for several days induced me to resist all their endeavours to make matters up, but I at last consented, much against my own inclination, (and I believe, even now, that I was wrong in doing so,) on condition the Admiral would write me a proper letter on the subject. He did write me a letter, which I subjoin:

219I made answer:—

Thus ended this unpleasant affair, and all the correspondence was cancelled and destroyed. I cannot say that I was satisfied with the Admiral’s letter: the affront was public, and the reparation should have been public also, but the opinion of my brother officers was, that I ought not to push the matter further, and I most unwillingly complied with their wishes.

It is with reluctance that I have been obliged to treat on this subject, but to write an account of the campaign in Syria and the capture of Acre, without entering upon a point not properly understood, was impossible. I have endeavoured to state plainly everything that occurred, without casting censure 220upon any one; and the reader must judge whether I was right or wrong.

I close this Chapter with Sir Charles Smith’s report to Lord Palmerston, and the Admiral’s letter to the Admiralty, in which he followed the example of Sir John Jervis, on the 14th of February, 1797, and made no mention of either the second in command, who led in one division, or of Captain Collier, who led in another, or any of the other officers engaged. Captains Boxer and Codrington were thanked for their exertions in sounding. In a second letter which he wrote, and where he had an opportunity of correcting this omission, he makes mention only of his own captain and flag-lieutenant.

230Return of killed and wounded in the squadron under the orders of Admiral the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, Commander-in-Chief, in the attack of the fortifications of St. Jean d’Acre, on the 3rd of November, 1840:—

Princess Charlotte—Killed, 1 seaman.

Powerful—Wounded, 1 seaman severely, 2 seamen and 1 royal marine slightly.

Bellerophon—None killed or wounded.

Revenge—Killed, 1 seaman, 1 drummer, royal marines; wounded, 3 seamen severely, 1 royal marine slightly.

Thunderer—None killed or wounded.

Castor—Killed, 4 seamen; wounded, 1 seaman severely, 3 seamen slightly, 2 privates royal marines severely, 1 private royal marine slightly.

Edinburgh—Killed, 2 seamen, 1 drummer royal marine, 1 private royal marine; wounded, Commander F.D. Hastings, slightly; Mr. John Davies, master, slightly; Mr. Joseph Plimsoll, assistant-surgeon, slightly; Mr. Henry Boys, midshipman, slightly; 1 seaman, 1 boy slightly, 1 sergeant royal marines slightly.

Benbow—None killed or wounded.

Pique—None killed or wounded.

Carysfort—None killed or wounded.

Talbot—Wounded, Lieutenant G.B. Le Mesurier, since dead; Mr. Henry Haswell, mate, slightly; 1 seaman severely.

Gorgon—None killed or wounded.

Wasp—Wounded, 5 seamen severely, 1 private royal marine.

231Stromboli—None killed or wounded.

Phœnix—None killed or wounded.

Vesuvius—None killed or wounded.

Hazard—Wounded, 1 private royal marine, 1 boy slightly.

Turkish flag-ship, Rear-Admiral Walker—4 killed, 3 wounded.

Medea, Austrian flag-ship, Rear-Admiral Bandeira—1 killed, 4 wounded.

Guerriera, Austrian frigate—1 killed, 2 wounded.

Total killed, 18—Total wounded, 41.

Second Explosion at Acre—Prisoners sent to Beyrout—The Author ordered to Alexandria with a Squadron—Letter from the Emir—Neglected State of his Troops—English Commissary-General appointed—Excursion to the Mountains—Padre Ryllo—French Priests in Lebanon—Visit to the Wife of an Emir—Bad conduct of the Turks—Letters to Lord Ponsonby, Palmerston, and Minto on the subject.

A day or two after the surrender of the ill-fated town of Acre, another severe explosion took place, but fortunately few suffered. Captain Collier had his leg broke, and Sir Charles Smith received a contusion on the foot.

The prisoners were sent in the ships-of-war to Beyrout; and I was directed to proceed there also, complete my water, and then take the command of the squadron off Alexandria, which was to be increased to six sail of the line. I had gained so much influence over the mountaineers that I did not think this a wise measure; and the Admiralty seemed to have been of the same opinion, for orders were afterwards sent for the Powerful to return.

The Admiral had decided to winter in Marmorice 233Bay, and leave the Benbow at Beyrout, Pique and Zebra at Acre, and the other small vessels and steamers on various parts of the coast. We arrived at Beyrout on the 9th of November, and a few days after were followed by the Admiral who, with the rest of the squadron, anchored in St. George’s Bay, with the exception of the Bellerophon, which remained off the town. The anchorage at the latter place in winter is far from safe; the former is quite open, but the holding-ground good. We found things in the same state; Ibrahim was concentrated at Zachle and Malaka, and the Turkish troops divided between Tripoli, Beyrout, Sidon, Acre, and Tyre. About this time they must have amounted to 12,000. The Emir Bechir had been left to himself to watch the mountains the best way he could, without either forces or provisions, and why Ibrahim did not attack him, and march upon Beyrout, is to me inexplicable. The Emir shall tell his own story.

I communicated this to Sir Charles Smith, who immediately gave orders to the Turkish authorities to send the supplies that were wanted; they, however, knew very little of the movements of a Commissariat, and the probability is the orders were badly executed. Shortly after, a Commissary General arrived from England to take charge of this department.

235Three days after my arrival at Beyrout, I made an excursion to the mountains, and went over the ground whence we had so recently driven Ibrahim Pacha. It was indeed a fine position; and how so renowned a warrior as Ibrahim Pacha could have allowed himself to be driven from such a post, is not easily to be accounted for. After getting possession of the third position, there is a cavalry country; and had he taken the precaution of ordering up a couple of squadrons of Souliman Pacha’s horse, and attacked us unexpectedly, we should have lost many men before we could have recovered from the disorder unavoidably caused by the difficulty of the ascent. After going over the ground, we partook of the hospitality of Padre Ryllo, at Bechfaya. He had been an officer in the Polish army; and, after witnessing the destruction of his country, became a priest, and took refuge in the mountains of Lebanon. He was a most useful and intelligent man; had a large correspondence through the country, and was most serviceable in procuring information. Besides the Padre, there were half a dozen more priests in the convent, French and Italians, who possessed great influence in the mountains, and turned their attention to the 236education of the people. The French priests were, generally speaking, in the interest of Mehemet Ali; and all his correspondence with the mountains was carried on through them, and by means of French vessels of war stationed on various parts of the coast. We were well aware of this inconvenience; but it was very difficult, if not impossible, to remedy it, without running the risk of collision with France, which the Government was anxious to avoid.

After enjoying a good dinner, we mounted our horses, and proceeded along the summit of the mountains leading to Brumanah. The greater part of the villages in this district had been burnt by order of Ibrahim, after the first affair of Ornagacuan, and it was out of my power to prevent it. Brumanah was in ruins also; it had been destroyed by a party of Albanians during the insurrection. We were well received by the wife of the Emir of the place, whose name I do not recollect; she was mother to the wife of the Emir Bechir Cassim. We had a tolerable dinner served on a low table; and were afterwards invited into the ladies’ apartment, where were seated the Princess and her two daughters, smoking their pipes, dressed out in all their finery. The three 237ladies wore horns on their heads, studded with jewels, about two feet and a half long, over which were hung veils, the horn richly ornamented. The old lady had lost her beauty, but not her dignity. The husband of the eldest daughter was a prisoner in Nubia; and when she heard I was going off Alexandria, she implored me to obtain his release; she was a determined smoker, and frequently handed me her pipe. The second daughter was unmarried and handsome, and also treated me occasionally with a whiff, which is considered a high compliment on the mountains. After a good deal of conversation, through the medium of an interpreter, we were served with coffee; the ladies then retired, and we followed their example; but as usual, were kept awake the greater part of the night by our numerous bed-fellows, who appeared more inveterate in this château than we had ever found them before. After breakfast we mounted our horses, and made the best of our way to Beyrout.

The Turks now considering themselves pretty secure in Lebanon, took no pains to gain the good will of the inhabitants; on the contrary, they soon made them feel that they had gained nothing by the change of masters. Before leaving Beyrout for 238Alexandria, I wrote to Lord Ponsonby the following letter on the subject:—

241This letter I followed up by one to Lord Palmerston:—

I next wrote as follows to Lord Minto:—

The Author sent to Alexandria—Defences of the Town—Lord Palmerston’s Instructions to Lord Ponsonby—Lord Ponsonby’s dislike to Mehemet Ali—The Author’s Correspondence with Boghos Bey—Interview with the Pacha—His Arsenal—Further Correspondence—Signature of the Convention.

The Admiral having thought it necessary to increase the squadron off Alexandria to six sail of the line, I sailed on the 15th November to take the command; the object was to make a powerful demonstration before Alexandria under my pennant, as the Admiral wrote to me. The rest of the squadron, as I have before stated, were to be withdrawn, with the exception of the Benbow. Ibrahim at this time had collected a very strong force at Zachle and Malaka, and I thought it very probable, unless he had decided to abandon Syria altogether, that he would take advantage of the absence of the squadron, and march a strong force on Beyrout. Had he attempted such an enterprise he must have succeeded; Sidon would then have fallen, and probably Acre, for the explosion had blown a great part of the 249land-face down, and the temporary reparations could not have resisted a powerful force.

On the 21st of November I arrived off Alexandria, where I found the Rodney, Revenge, Ganges, Vanguard, and Cambridge, of the line; Carysfort, and Medea, steamer. The latter a few days before had been nearly blown up by the bursting of a shell. Before communicating with the squadron, I ran in and reconnoitred the defences: the sea-face appeared covered with guns, but, with the exception of the Pharo Castle, I saw nothing that could resist a strong naval force; but still any attack without troops would lead to no result, and at this season of the year, even if a force could have been spared, it would not have been prudent to have attempted it.

When I joined the squadron I was put in possession of a copy of the following letter from Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby:

This letter shows that the British Government was not quite satisfied with the deposition of Mehemet Ali. The British Ambassador at Constantinople merely announced it in a short despatch; but his dislike of Mehemet Ali was so little concealed, that it was generally supposed he used all his influence with the Porte to induce the Sultan to depose him. Great praise is, however, due to his Excellency, for the vigour with which he had pushed the armaments at Constantinople, and I believe, had it not been for his exertions, neither a Turkish army or fleet would ever have appeared on the coast of Syria. Had the Ambassador stopped here, and recommended the Porte to be satisfied with the possession of that country, he would have shown himself a great statesman, and a wise man; but it will shortly be seen that he was so exasperated 253against Mehemet Ali, that he endeavoured to hurry the Porte into measures, that they had not the power of carrying into execution, against the wish of the Ambassadors of the other Powers, and at the imminent risk of a war with France.

I saw things through a very different telescope. We had met with great success, more than we had the least right to expect, and notwithstanding the menaces of France, a European war had as yet been avoided. I knew it was the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to leave the coast, and also shortly to recall the squadron from Alexandria. Ibrahim had collected his troops at Damascus, Zachle, and Malaka, and they could not have consisted of less than 60,000 men. He had the reputation of being a great General, and the talents of Souliman were undoubted; he had met with uninterrupted success in all his campaigns, with the exception of the last; and it was natural to expect he would seize the first opportunity of wiping off the stain on his military reputation. He must have known that the mountaineers were badly provisioned and unsupported by a regular force, and that the Turkish troops were scattered in various garrisons, and as the season advanced would be unsupported by a British fleet. 254I gave Ibrahim credit for attempting to do the same thing I should have done in similar circumstances, and I determined to take the responsibility on myself, and at once open a communication with Mehemet Ali. Captain Maunsell, of the Rodney, was an old friend of the Pacha's, and I decided on making him my negotiator, and next morning he proceeded with a flag of truce to Alexandria with the subjoined letter to Boghos Bey:—

Captain Maunsell returned next evening with the answer, accompanied by the English Consul, Mr. Larking.

The weather had been fine, but still we could not expect a long continuance of it. Mehemet Ali I knew was in some fears that Alexandria might share the fate of Acre; a gale of wind driving us off the coast would relieve him from those fears, and restore his confidence, powerfully supported as he would have been by France. I was so satisfied with Boghos Bey’s answer, that, to save time, I resolved, to accompany Captain Maunsell, who returned with the following letter, and offer an interview, which was accepted.

265The Minister speedily made answer, in these terms:

The Turco-Egyptian squadron, consisting of twenty-one sail of the line, and numerous frigates and corvettes were, when I arrived, lying in the harbour, with the yards and topmasts struck; but at noon on the 24th of November, being the first day of the Bairam, an unusual movement was observed on board the ships, and they began to sway their masts up, and before sun-set, their royal yards were across, and after dusk they were brilliantly illuminated.

On the morning of the 25th, I entered the harbour of Alexandria in the Medea steamer, passed through the Turco-Egyptian fleet, and anchored off the Palace. I then landed and proceeded to the house of the British Consul, Mr. Larking. As the Pacha was receiving visits from his officers and the principal inhabitants of Alexandria, he appointed the following day at noon to receive me. In the afternoon we walked about the town, and there 268appeared much satisfaction in the countenances of the inhabitants of all nations and all religions at being released from the apprehension they entertained of having their town knocked about their ears.

Alexandria is a tolerably good town, and is fast improving. The naval establishments of the Pacha are wonderful, and whatever may be said against Mehemet Ali, it must be admitted, that no man of ordinary abilities could have in so short a time accomplished what he has done. I am not sure that the means employed were justifiable, but judging him by an Oriental standard, which is the only fair way of judging him, he must be considered an astonishing man. In less than twenty years he has created an army and a navy, and a dockyard that would do credit to any nation; he has constructed nine or ten sail of the line, and some of them very fine ships; he has made officers and sailors of his Arabs, and has instilled some of his own activity into the minds of the indolent Turks in his service.

His dockyard is very complete; there is a large basin capable of holding all his squadron; his storehouses are well built, and full of stores, and the 269whole establishment is well arranged. Everything is done in the arsenal. He builds his ships, makes his masts, yards, sails, rope, cabin furniture, compasses, quadrants, clothing for the crews, (out of his own manufactures,) shoes, &c.; he paints oil-cloths for the cabins of his officers, and even the sealing-wax and wafers they are supplied with are made in the arsenal. He is now constructing a dry-dock, which is, however, getting on very slow, and I do not think they are going the right way about it. His principal officers, and, indeed, many of the inferior ones, have been brought up in our arsenals, and appear perfectly to understand their business. Outside of the dockyard is a tolerably well built village for the wives and families of the crews, half of which are allowed to be on shore every night.

Previously to my interview with the Pacha, the following letters passed between the Minister and myself:

At noon on the 26th I proceeded to the Palace, accompanied by Captains Maunsell, Martin, and Warden. Sir William Eden, who was on board the Carysfort, did me also the honour of accompanying me, and Mr. Larking, the British Consul; and I must take this opportunity of stating how much I am indebted to Sir William Eden for some valuable suggestions; as also to Captains Maunsell and Martin. A battalion of Egyptian troops was drawn up in the court-yard of the Palace, and presented arms, the band playing martial airs.

On entering the reception-room of Mehemet Ali, which is in the old palace, we were most graciously received. The Pacha, in a short dress, was standing surrounded by his officers, and free admission seemed to have been given to Franks of all 274description. After a few compliments on both sides, the Pacha walked to a corner of the room, and seated himself on his Divan. Pipes and coffee were called for, and we smoked away for a considerable time, as if we had been the best friends in the world. The palace was too crowded to enter into business; and it was arranged I should again see the Pacha in the evening, after communicating with Boghos Bey, and give him in writing the terms I wished him to comply with.

The Pacha is a man of low stature, is a good deal marked with the small-pox, his complexion sallow, his eyes quick and penetrating. He wears a fine white beard; and when in good humour, has a most fascinating manner; but when out of temper, his eyes sparkle, he raises himself up in his corner, and soon convinces you he is much easier led than driven. He is easy of access, and indeed fond of gossipping; and seems to be informed of every thing that is either said or done in Alexandria. He has many friends amongst the Franks; and when he takes a liking, the man’s fortune is made. He has built a very handsome palace, and furnished it with taste. Opposite the palace is the harem, where his wife resides; but 275the old gentleman has given up his visits to that establishment.

After leaving the Pacha I had an interview with the Bey, and settled with him the terms of the Convention, which was submitted to the Pacha in the evening, and after some discussion was agreed upon. I was anxious that the Egyptian troops should be embarked and return by sea, because I foresaw their retiring by land would disorganize the whole of Syria, and stir up the evil passions of the inhabitants, which would not easily subside. Besides I was afraid some untoward event might bring the Turks and Egyptians into contact, and upset all I had been doing. Mehemet Ali, on the other hand, afraid of foul play, (and the sequel has proved he had reason,) was anxious they should retire by land; and it is singular enough that there was a greater outcry against that Article which he did not like, than against all the other Articles of the Convention; and I feel quite satisfied that the hold of Turkey on Syria has been more weakened by that retreat than by any other follies they have since committed; the different sects know their strength, and the day is not far distant when the Turks will be driven out of the country, with a severer loss than Ibrahim Pacha met with.

276The subjoined correspondence, together with the Convention, is the best account I can give of the progress of the transaction:—

277I received no answer to this letter, but the following was published in the Journal des Debats:—

I had already detained the Oriental with the India mail three days, and not thinking it proper to keep her longer, I decided on sending the correspondence by her, and the Convention, when signed, by the Medea. I wrote at the same time to Lord Palmerston.

On the morning of the 28th, the Treaty being signed, I left Alexandria, and returned to the Powerful. The Prometheus steamer had joined the day before, and I now dispatched her to Beyrout to the Commander-in-Chief; and the Medea, with the Treaty and the rest of the correspondence, to the Admiralty.

284In order, if possible, to avoid giving rise to any cavil, I thought it necessary, at the time of signing the Convention, to address the following explanatory note to the Minister of Mehemet Ali:

Venturing on so important a measure as this Convention without authority, would only be justified by the result; but it was not without precedent. Sir Sydney Smith had entered into a Convention with the French for the evacuation of Egypt, and Captain Foote had also, when serving under Lord Nelson, entered into one for the evacuation 285of Naples. Both were rejected by their superior officers. The rejection of the first led to the expedition to Egypt, which cost some millions, and the loss of much life; the rejection of the last, to scenes that are better buried in oblivion.

Convention concluded between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia on the one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte on the other, for the pacification of the Levant, signed at London, July 15, 1840.

In the Name of the Most Merciful God.

His Highness the Sultan having addressed himself to their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, to ask their support and assistance in the difficulties in which he finds himself placed by reason of the hostile proceedings of Mehemet Ali, Pacha of Egypt,—difficulties which threaten with danger the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of the Sultan’s throne,—Their said Majesties, moved by the sincere friendship which subsists between them and the Sultan; animated by the desire of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe; faithful to the engagement which they 288contracted by the Collective Note presented to the Porte by their Representatives at Constantinople, on the 27th of July, 1839; and desirous, moreover, to prevent the effusion of blood which would be occasioned by a continuance of the hostilities which have recently broken out in Syria between the authorities of the Pacha of Egypt and the subjects of the Sultan; their said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan have resolved, for the aforesaid purposes, to conclude together a Convention, and they have therefore named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Henry John Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of Her Britannic Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, a Member of Parliament, and her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Sieur Philip, Baron de Neumann, Commander of the Order of Leopold of Austria, decorated with the Cross for Civil Merit, Commander of the Orders of the Tower and Sword of Portugal, of the Southern Cross of Brazil, Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stanislaus of the Second Class of Russia, his Aulick Councillor, and his Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty;

His Majesty the King of Prussia, the Sieur 289Henry William, Baron de Bulow, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle of the First Class of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Orders of Leopold of Austria, and of the Guelphs of Hanover, Knight Grand Cross of the Orders of St. Stanislaus of the Second Class, and of St. Wladimir of the Fourth Class of Russia, Commander of the Order of the Falcon of Saxe-Weimar, his Chamberlain, actual Privy Councillor, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Philip, Baron de Brunnow, Knight of the Order of St. Anne of the First Class, of St. Stanislaus of the First Class, of St. Wladimir of the Third, Commander of the Order of St. Stephen of Hungary, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle, and of St. John of Jerusalem, his Privy Councillor, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty;

And His Majesty the Most Noble, Most Powerful, and Most Magnificent Sultan Abdul Medjid, Emperor of the Ottomans, Chekib Effendi, decorated with the Nichan Iftihar of the First Class, Beylikdgi of the Imperial Divan, Honorary Councillor of the Department for Foreign Affairs, his Ambassador Extraordinary to Her Britannic Majesty;

Who, having reciprocally communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following Articles:—

290Art. I.—His Highness the Sultan having come to an agreement with their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, as to the conditions of the arrangement which it is the intention of His Highness to grant to Mehemet Ali, conditions which are specified in the Separate Act hereunto annexed; Their Majesties engage to act in perfect accord, and to unite their efforts in order to determine Mehemet Ali to conform to that arrangement; each of the High Contracting Parties reserving to itself to co-operate for that purpose, according to the means of action which each may have at its disposal.

Art. II.—If the Pacha of Egypt should refuse to accept the above-mentioned arrangement, which will be communicated to him by the Sultan, with the concurrence of their aforesaid Majesties; Their Majesties engage to take, at the request of the Sultan, measures concerted and settled between them, in order to carry that arrangement into effect. In the meanwhile, the Sultan having requested his said Allies to unite with him in order to assist him to cut off the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria, and to prevent the transport of troops, horses, arms, and warlike stores of all kinds, from the one province to the other; Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of Austria, King of 291Hungary and Bohemia, engage to give immediately to that effect, the necessary orders to their naval Commanders in the Mediterranean. Their said Majesties further engage, that the naval Commanders of their squadrons shall, according to the means at their command, afford, in the name of the Alliance, all the support and assistance in their power to those subjects of the Sultan who may manifest their fidelity and allegiance to their Sovereign.

Art. III.—If Mehemet Ali, after having refused to submit to the conditions of the arrangement above-mentioned, should direct his land or sea forces against Constantinople, the High Contracting Parties, upon the express demand of the Sultan, addressed to their Representatives at Constantinople, agree, in such case, to comply with the request of that Sovereign, and to provide for the defence of his throne by means of a co-operation agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the Capital of the Ottoman Empire, in security against all aggression.

It is further agreed, that the forces which, in virtue of such concert, may be sent as aforesaid, shall there remain so employed as long as their presence shall be required by the Sultan; and when His Highness shall deem their presence no longer necessary, the said forces shall simultaneously withdraw, and shall return to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean, respectively.

292Art. IV.—It is, however, expressly understood, that the co-operation mentioned in the preceding Article, and destined to place the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and the Ottoman Capital, under the temporary safeguard of the High Contracting Parties against all aggression of Mehemet Ali, shall be considered only as a measure of exception adopted at the express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case above-mentioned; but it is agreed, that such measure shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus. And the Sultan, on the one hand, hereby declares that, excepting the contingency above-mentioned, it is his firm resolution to maintain in future this principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his empire; and as long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign ship of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles; on the other hand, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the above-mentioned principle.

Art. V.—The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged 293at London at the expiration of two months, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of Lord One thousand Eight hundred and forty.

Separate Act annexed to the Convention concluded at London on the 15th of July, 1840.

His Highness the Sultan intends to grant, and to cause to be notified to Mehemet Ali, the conditions of the arrangement hereinafter detailed:—

§ 1. His Highness promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pachalic of Egypt; and his Highness promises, moreover, to grant to Mehemet Ali, for his life, with the title of Pacha of Acre, and with the command of the fortress of St. John of Acre, the administration of the southern part of Syria, the limits of which shall be determined by the following line of demarkation:

This line, beginning at Cape Ras-el-Nakhora, on the coast of the Mediterranean, shall extend direct 294from thence as far as the mouth of the river Seisaban, at the northern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias; it shall pass along the western shore of that lake, it shall follow the right bank of the river Jordan, and the western shore of the Dead Sea; from thence it shall extend straight to the Red Sea, which it shall strike at the northern point of the Gulf of Akaba, and from thence it shall follow the western shore of the Gulf of Akaba, and the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, as far as Suez.

The Sultan, however, in making these offers, attaches thereto the condition, that Mehemet Ali shall accept them within the space of ten days after communication thereof shall have been made to him at Alexandria, by an Agent of his Highness; and that Mehemet Ali shall, at the same time, place in the hands of that Agent the necessary instructions to the Commanders of his sea and land forces, to withdraw immediately from Arabia, and from all the Holy Cities which are therein situated; from the Island of Candia; from the district of Adana; and from all other parts of the Ottoman Empire which are not comprised within the limits of Egypt, and within those of the Pachalic of Acre, as above defined.

§ 2. If within the space of ten days, fixed as above, Mehemet Ali should not accept the above-mentioned arrangement, the Sultan will then withdraw the offer of the life administration of the Pachalic of Acre; but His Highness will still consent 295to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pachalic of Egypt, provided such offer be accepted within the space of ten days next following; that is to say, within a period of twenty days, to be reckoned from the day on which the communication shall have been made to him; and provided that in this case also, he places in the hands of the Agent of the Sultan the necessary instructions to his military and naval commanders, to withdraw immediately within the limits, and into the ports of the Pachalic of Egypt.

§ 3. The annual tribute to be paid to the Sultan by Mehemet Ali, shall be proportioned to the greater or less amount of territory of which the latter may obtain the administration, according as he accepts the first or the second alternative.

§ 4. It is, moreover, expressly understood, that, in the first as in the second alternative, Mehemet Ali (before the expiration of the specified period of ten or of twenty days), shall be bound to deliver up the Turkish fleet, with the whole of its crews and equipments, into the hands of the Turkish Agent who shall be charged to receive the same. The Commanders of the Allied Squadrons shall be present at such delivery.

It is understood, that in no case can Mehemet Ali carry to account, or deduct from the tribute to be paid to the Sultan, the expenses which he has incurred in the maintenance of the Ottoman fleet 296during any part of the time it shall have remained in the ports of Egypt.

§ 5. All the Treaties, and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire, shall be applicable to Egypt, and to the Pachalic of Acre, such as it has been above defined, in the same manner as to every other part of the Ottoman Empire. But the Sultan consents, that on condition of the regular payment of the tribute above-mentioned, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall collect, in the name of the Sultan, and as the delegate of His Highness, within the provinces the administration of which shall be confided to them, the taxes and imposts legally established. It is moreover understood, that in consideration of the receipt of the aforesaid taxes and imposts, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall defray all the expenses of the civil and military administration of the said provinces.

§ 6. The military and naval forces which may be maintained by the Pacha of Egypt and Acre, forming part of the forces of the Ottoman Empire, shall always be considered as maintained for the service of the State.

§ 7. If, at the expiration of the period of twenty days after the communication shall have been made to him (according to the stipulation of § 2), Mehemet Ali shall not accede to the proposed arrangement, and shall not accept the hereditary Pachalic of Egypt, the Sultan will consider himself at liberty to withdraw that offer, and to follow, in consequence, 297such ulterior course, as his own interests and the counsels of his Allies may suggest to him.

§ 8. The present Separate Act shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted, word for word, in the Convention of this date. It shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at London, at the same time as those of the said Convention.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord One thousand Eight hundred and forty.

Protocol signed at London, on the 15th of July, 1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey.

In affixing his signature to the Convention of this date, the Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Ottoman Porte declared:

That in recording by Article IV. of the said Convention the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, by virtue of which it has been at all times forbidden to foreign vessels of war to enter within the Straits 298of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, the Sublime Porte reserves to itself, as heretofore, to deliver passes to light vessels under flag of war, which may be employed according to custom, for the service of the correspondence of the Legations of Friendly Powers.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, took note of the above Declaration, for the purpose of communicating it to their respective Courts.

Reserved Protocol signed at London on the 15th of July, 1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, having, in virtue, of their full powers, concluded and signed this day a Convention between their respective Sovereigns, for the pacification of the Levant;

Considering that, in consequence of the distances which separate the Capitals of their respective Courts, a certain space of time must necessarily elapse before the ratifications of the said Convention can 299be exchanged, and before orders founded thereupon can be carried into execution;

And the said Plenipotentiaries being deeply impressed with the conviction, that by reason of the present state of things in Syria, the interests of humanity, as well as the grave considerations of European policy which constitute the object of the common solicitude of the Contracting Parties to the Convention of this day, imperiously require that, as far as possible, all delay should be avoided in the accomplishment of the pacification which the said Convention is intended to effect;

The said Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers, have agreed, that the preliminary measures mentioned in Article II. of the said Convention, shall be carried into execution at once, without waiting for the exchange of the ratifications; the respective Plenipotentiaries recording formally, by the present Instrument, the consent of their Courts to the immediate execution of these measures.

It is moreover agreed between the said Plenipotentiaries, that His Highness the Sultan will proceed immediately to address to Mehemet Ali, the communication and offers specified in the Separate Act annexed to the Convention of this day.

It is further agreed, that the Consular Agents of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, at Alexandria, shall place themselves in communication with the Agent whom His Highness may send thither to communicate to Mehemet Ali the above-mentioned 300offers; that the said Consuls shall afford to that Agent all the assistance and support in their power; and shall use all their means of influence with Mehemet Ali, in order to persuade him to accept the arrangement which will be proposed to him by order of His Highness the Sultan.

The Admirals of the respective squadrons in the Mediterranean shall be instructed to place themselves in communication with the said Consuls on this subject.

“If Women could once be made to understand their real mission in this world, and to feel their own importance and responsibility, a surprising change must immediately take place in society, giving it a higher tone and purer spirit.”

Chap. I.—Laws of the Nervous System relating to Sensation and Voluntary Motion.

Chap. II.—Application of the preceding Laws to explain Pathological Phenomena.

Chap. III.—Influence of the Nervous System on the merely Corporeal Functions.

Chap. IV.—Relation of the Brain to the Intellectual Faculties and active Principles of our Nature.

Diversities of Constitution. Of Digestion. Of Exercise. Physical Education of Girls; Spinal Curvature. Of Sleep. Of Bathing. Of Clothing. Of Air and Climate. Health of Mind. Self-control. Mental Culture.

The traveller and the historian, the artist and the artisan, offer their various works and productions for the study or recreation of young and old, but they invite attention, for the most part, to the imperfect works of man; and their productions, though valuable in themselves, possess not that attractive interest and unwearying amusement, which is to be found in the contemplation of the perfect works of Nature. But can it be doubted that, in the beautiful and endless variety of Nature’s works, there exists a store of unfailing amusement and instruction, the pursuit of which is sure to form a profitable occupation for the general reader during many a leisure hour, and is also admirably calculated to supersede many of the recreations of the young, which are productive of no useful results?

Ancient Astronomy. Mechanics. Hydrostatics. Optics, and Harmonics. Modern Astronomy. Mechanics. Hydrostatics. Optics. Acoustics. Heat. Electricity. Magnetism. Galvanism. Chemistry. Electro-Chemistry. Mineralogy. Botany. Animal Physiology. Zoology. Geology.

These Sheets, though intended chiefly for the use of Schools, will also be found useful in the Instruction of Classes provided with Books, as saving the Teacher the time and labour required for the use of the Black Board. The succeeding Numbers are in the Press.