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?>
<div id="mongodb.security.request_injection" class="section">
  <h2 class="title">Request Injection Attacks</h2>
  <p class="para">
   If you are passing <code class="literal">$_GET</code> (or <code class="literal">$_POST</code>)
   parameters to your queries, make sure that they are cast to strings first.
   Users can insert associative arrays in GET and POST requests, which could
   then become unwanted $-queries.
  </p>

  <p class="para">
   A fairly innocuous example: suppose you are looking up a user&#039;s information
   with the request <em>http://www.example.com?username=bob</em>.
   Your application creates the query
   <code class="literal">$q = new \MongoDB\Driver\Query( [ &#039;username&#039; =&gt; $_GET[&#039;username&#039;] ])</code>.
  </p>

  <p class="para">
   Someone could subvert this by getting
   <em>http://www.example.com?username[$ne]=foo</em>, which PHP
   will magically turn into an associative array, turning your query into
   <code class="literal">$q = new \MongoDB\Driver\Query( [ &#039;username&#039; =&gt; [ &#039;$ne&#039; =&gt; &#039;foo&#039; ] ] )</code>,
   which will return all users not named &quot;foo&quot; (all of your users, probably).
  </p>

  <p class="para">
   This is a fairly easy attack to defend against: make sure $_GET and $_POST
   parameters are the type you expect before you send them to the database.
   PHP has the <span class="function"><a href="function.filter-var.php" class="function">filter_var()</a></span> function to assist with this.
  </p>

  <p class="para">
   Note that this type of attack can be used with any database interaction that
   locates a document, including updates, upserts, deletes, and findAndModify
   commands.
  </p>

  <p class="para">
   See <a href="https://www.mongodb.com/docs/manual/security/" class="link external">&raquo;&nbsp;the main documentation</a>
   for more information about SQL-injection-like issues with MongoDB.
  </p>
 </div><?php manual_footer($setup); ?>